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The literature treats overcriminalization (and, at the federal level, the 
federalization of crime) as a quantitative problem.  Legislatures, on this 
view, have simply enacted too many crimes, and those crimes are far too 
broad in scope.  This Article uses federal criminal law as a basis for 
challenging this way of conceptualizing the overcriminalization problem.  
The real problem with overcriminalization is qualitative, not quantitative: 
federal crimes are poorly defined, and courts all too often expansively 
construe poorly defined crimes.  Courts thus are not passive victims in the 
vicious cycle of overcriminalization.  Rather, by repeatedly interpreting 
criminal statutes broadly, courts have taken the features of federal criminal 
law that critics of federalization find objectionable—its enormous scope 
and its severity—and made them considerably worse.  By changing how 
they interpret criminal statutes, the federal courts can help overcome 
overcriminalization even if Congress continues to be unrestrained in its use 
of the criminal sanction. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few issues have received more sustained attention from criminal law 
scholars over the last half-century than overcriminalization.  It is fair to say 
the judgment of the scholarly community has been overwhelmingly 
negative.  From all across the political spectrum, there is wide consensus 
that overcriminalization is a serious problem.
1
  Indeed, a recent book-length 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.  I am grateful to Albert Alschuler, Darryl 
Brown, John Jeffries, and Daniel Richman for a variety of helpful exchanges over the years 
about overcriminalization and the serious problems it has created.  Like everyone else in the 
field, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my former teacher, the late Professor William J. 
Stuntz, who left behind an enduring body of work (including his posthumously published 
masterwork, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011)) showing that American 
criminal law and procedure is heavy on law but often surprisingly light on justice.  Professor 
Stuntz was taken from us far too soon, and we are all the poorer for it.  Requiescat in Pace. 
1 As one leading scholar has explained, overcriminalization “has long been the starting 
point for virtually all the scholarship in this field, which (with the important exception of 
sexual assault) consistently argues that existing criminal liability rules are too broad and 
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treatment of the subject describes overcriminalization as “the most pressing 
problem with the criminal law today.”
2
 
As the term implies, “overcriminalization” posits that there are too 
many criminal laws on the books today.  It is, of course, difficult to make 
such claims without a normative baseline—an idea of what constitutes the 
“right” number of criminal laws—and such a baseline is elusive at best.  
Still, history and crime rates provide relevant benchmarks, and they suggest 
that the criminal sanction is being seriously overused, particularly at the 
federal level, where overcriminalization has resulted in nothing less than the 
federalization of crime. 
Federal criminal law has been growing at a breakneck pace for 
generations.  According to a 1998 American Bar Association report, an 
incredible 40% of the thousands of federal criminal laws passed since the 
Civil War were enacted after 1970.
3
  The relentless pace at which new 
federal crimes are passed has continued despite significant recent declines 
in crime rates.  On average, Congress created fifty-seven new crimes every 
year between 2000 and 2007, roughly the same rate of criminalization from 
the two prior decades, resulting today in some 4,500 federal laws that carry 
criminal penalties.
4
  Thus, whether crime rates are rising or falling, the one 
constant—as predictable as death and taxes—is that scores of new federal 
criminal statutes are being enacted. 
In addition to the ever-expanding number of criminal statutes, standard 
critiques of overcriminalization also bemoan the broad scope of modern 
criminal codes.  Contemporary criminal codes reach conduct that, in 
previous generations, would not have been subject to punishment.  The 
classic example is so-called regulatory offenses.  These offenses punish 
conduct that is mala prohibita, or wrongful only because it is illegal, and 
may allow punishment where “consciousness of wrongdoing be totally 
wanting.”
5
  With the proliferation of regulatory offenses, infractions that in 
 
ought to be narrowed.”  William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001). 
2 DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2007) 
(emphasis added). 
3 AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998); see also John S. 
Baker, Jr., Corporations: Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation, 
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y’S PRAC. GROUPS, Oct. 2004, at 23, 27, available at 
http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20080313_CorpsBaker.pdf. (finding more than a one-third 
increase in the number of federal crimes since the early 1980s). 
4 See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 26: REVISITING 
THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 5 (2008). 
5 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943).  As Dotterweich explained, 
regulatory offenses employ criminal penalties as a form of regulation to promote the 
effectiveness of health, safety, and welfare rules otherwise enforced through noncriminal 
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prior generations might not even have resulted in civil fines or tort liability 
are now subject to the punishment and stigma of the criminal law.
6
 
This is the conventional account of overcriminalization.  It reflects the 
deeply held beliefs of many scholars and participants in the public policy 
arena.  Unfortunately, as true as it is, it is remarkably incomplete—so 
incomplete, in fact, as to be potentially misleading. 
As I hope to demonstrate in this Article, the usual overcriminalization 
story has two key shortcomings.  First, it obscures an important causal 
factor in the rise of overcriminalization—which, properly understood, is not 
a function of legislative choice alone.  The overcriminalization problem is 
not simply that legislatures have enacted too many criminal laws and cast 
those laws in terms that are too expansive in reach.  Courts bear a large 
share of the blame for overcriminalization, given their penchant to construe 
ambiguous criminal statutes broadly in a misguided quest to ensure that 
morally blameworthy offenders will not escape conviction.  Second, 
standard critiques of the number and scope of criminal laws give 
insufficient attention to the serious crime-definition and sentencing 
problems that make a broad and deep criminal code so troubling in practice.  
These problems, at their root, are not that they expose too much conduct to 
punishment, but rather that they reach conduct that either does not deserve 
punishment or that does not deserve the amount of punishment provided for 
in particular contexts. 
Both of these shortcomings in conventional understandings of 
overcriminalization emanate from a common mistake—namely, the 
tendency to think about overcriminalization primarily in quantitative terms.  
That is to say, overcriminalization is typically framed as an objection to the 
 
means.  See id. at 280–81.  Regulatory offenses differ from the types of crimes punishable at 
common law, which were deemed mala in se, or wrong in themselves.  See Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–57 (1952) (distinguishing common law and regulatory 
offenses). 
6 Another frequently voiced complaint about the scope of modern criminal codes is that 
they contain a host of outmoded “morals” offenses, commonly understood as offenses that 
punish even “victimless” crimes principally as a means of expressing moral disapproval.  
See, e.g., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 296–331 (1968).  
Even when the moralistic impulses that originally gave rise to such laws have abated, and 
such laws have fallen into desuetude, the laws remain enforceable at the whim of law 
enforcement agents and prosecutors.  A case in point is the White Slave Traffic Act, also 
known as the Mann Act, which as originally passed prohibited the transportation of females 
“for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”  Ch. 395, 
§ 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2006)).  Although largely 
unenforced today, the prospect of federal prosecution for a dalliance with a prostitute was 
serious enough to force former New York state governor Eliot Spitzer to resign from office.  
See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, No U.S. Prostitution Charges Against Spitzer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at A1. 
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number of criminal laws on the books (which is viewed as too high) and to 
the reach of those laws (which is viewed as too broad).
7
 
It is important to recognize, however, that overcriminalization has 
qualitative dimensions—dimensions that may be even more significant to 
the integrity and efficacy of the criminal law than its better-known 
quantitative aspects.  Simply put, overcriminalization tends to degrade the 
quality of criminal codes and to undermine the effort, important to 
retributivists and utilitarians alike,
8
 to provide just and proportional 
punishments for offenses.  For example, a code that is too large and grows 
too rapidly will often be poorly organized, structured, and conceived.  The 
resulting laws may not be readily accessible or comprehensible to those 
subject to their commands.  Moreover, a sprawling, rapidly growing 
criminal code is especially likely to contain crimes in which the all-
important conduct (actus reus) and state of mind (mens rea) elements are 
incompletely fleshed out.  These kinds of drafting and interpretive flaws 
can give unwarranted and perhaps unintended sweep to criminal laws and 
threaten disproportionately severe punishment. 
As a strategic matter, the difficulty with the standard conception of 
overcriminalization (and, at the federal level, the federalization of crime) is 
that it points to a disease for which there is no possible cure.  Framing 
overcriminalization as a quantitative problem leaves only two possible 
solutions: either legislatures must repeal, or courts must declare 
unconstitutional, large swaths of existing criminal codes.  No one thinks 
either prospect is likely, and for good reason, given entrenched patterns of 
legislative and judicial behavior.
9
  To the extent that overcriminalization, 
understood as a quantitative problem, is what ails American criminal law, 
the prognosis is grim indeed. 
 
7 See generally Stuntz, supra note 1.  A closely related phenomenon, not strictly 
speaking falling under the heading of overcriminalization, is overpunishment—the constant 
push to increase penalties by, for example, imposing mandatory minimum sentences and 
raising maximum punishments. 
8 See Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV. 879, 887–88 
(2005). 
9 According to the leading account of the political economy of criminal law, lawmakers’ 
political and institutional incentives “always push[] toward broader liability rules, and 
toward harsher sentences as well.”  Stuntz, supra note 1, at 510.  The Constitution, as 
presently interpreted, not only fails to counteract this dynamic, it actually promotes it, albeit 
unintentionally, by regulating criminal procedure and taking a laissez faire approach to the 
funding of indigent criminal defense and to substantive criminal law (i.e., what can and 
cannot be punished criminally, and how crimes must be defined).  This is perverse, Professor 
Stuntz explains, because it “encourage[s] bad substantive law and underfunding.”  William J. 
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 
YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997).  Viewed as a quantitative matter, in short, overcriminalization is a 
problem without a constitutional “fix.” 
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Fortunately for overcriminalization’s many critics—among whom I 
count myself
10
—many of the qualitative problems associated with 
overcriminalization can be addressed without heroic self-restraint by 
legislatures or activism by the courts in limiting legislative lawmaking 
powers.  Lifting the quantitative blinders, as this Article advocates, reveals 
that there is much the courts can do on their own, without resort to any 
constitutional blunderbuss, to help the legal system overcome 
overcriminalization.  First, however, the nation’s judges need to take a long, 
hard look in the mirror.  If they do, they will find that they, along with 
legislatures and prosecutors, share in the blame for overcriminalization.  
This realization will no doubt come as a shock to them, and it should.  The 
good news is that realizing their contributory role in overcriminalization 
should give them a sense that they have the power—and, indeed, the 
responsibility—to construe criminal statutes in ways that make 
overcriminalization far less objectionable in practice, if not tolerable (or, as 
some would have it,
11
 possibly even positive in certain contexts). 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part II shows 
that courts, not just legislatures, share in the blame for overcriminalization.  
That is because courts routinely expand the scope of ambiguous criminal 
statutes, giving inadequate attention to cogent reasons for adopting 
narrower interpretations.
12
  Part III identifies some of overcriminalization’s 
leading qualitative problems.  This discussion underscores the notion 
established in Part II that courts have taken a criminal justice system 
characterized by rampant overcriminalization and made it considerably 
broader and harsher.  Part IV identifies interpretive strategies that courts, 
properly sensitized to the qualitative problems of overcriminalization, can 
and should employ to ameliorate those problems—strategies that, 
importantly, do not require courts to blaze new and unlikely trails in 
constitutional law or to hope against hope for self-restraint by legislatures 
and prosecutors. 
 
10 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8. 
11 See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008). 
12 As the statement in the text suggests, my focus is on statutory interpretation.  Thus, I 
do not address the other means through which the federal courts have greased the skids of 
overcriminalization: their expansive interpretation of Congress’s power to punish crimes 
under the Commerce Clause, which has served as the primary basis for the federalization of 
crime.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (ruling that Congress can regulate 
home-grown marijuana raised for personal medicinal use); United States v. Scarborough, 
431 U.S. 563 (1977) (holding that Congress can regulate the possession of any item that, at 
any time, has crossed a state line, even years after the item has come to rest in a particular 
state); United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (allowing Congress to regulate intrastate 
activities that, in the aggregate, have commercial effects). 
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As will become clear, the discussion of overcriminalization in this 
Article focuses on federal criminal law.  The phenomenon, however, is 
hardly unique to the federal system.  State legislators, prosecutors, and 
judges have the same incentives as their federal counterparts to expand the 
scope of criminal liability and increase penalties.
13
  Indeed, in some 
respects, overcriminalization may be even more entrenched at the state 
level.  After all, most state chief prosecutors and judges are elected by the 
public, giving them even stronger incentives than their federal counterparts 
to cultivate reputations for being “tough” on the kinds of crimes the public 
worries the most about, including crimes of violence and street crimes.
14
 
On the other hand, it may well be the case that overcriminalization is 
more readily and more commonly exploited at the federal level than the 
state level.  State prosecutors have far less agenda control than federal 
prosecutors.  State enforcement efforts are necessarily devoted to 
“politically necessary cases,” such as murders, rapes, drug dealing, 
burglaries, and thefts.
15
  These cases are understood to be the responsibility 
of state enforcers—which is why, for example, people who witness murders 
or drug deals call the police, not the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the 
Drug Enforcement Administration—and so state prosecutors simply do not 
have the luxury that their federal counterparts have to pass over serious 
crimes in favor of the overcriminalization horror stories that come from the 
federal system.
16
  Moreover, precisely because the state system is on the 
front lines of the proverbial war on crime, state enforcers face enormous 
resource constraints, both in terms of prosecutorial time
17
 and prison 
 
13 See generally Stuntz, supra note 1, at 529–46 (comparing the institutional incentives 
of actors in state and federal criminal law). 
14 See generally id. at 533–34, 540 (discussing the motivations and incentives of directly 
elected prosecutors and judges).  For an argument that reelection concerns push elected 
prosecutors and judges to enforce the death penalty with unwarranted vigor, see Stephen F. 
Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 307–33 (2008). 
15 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 543. 
16 These horror stories include small businessmen imprisoned for almost ten years for 
importing lobsters in safe containers that comported with American packaging standards but 
allegedly not those of a foreign nation, and an accident victim being convicted for having 
inadvertently wandered into a federal wilderness area on a snowmobile during a blinding 
blizzard.  See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Criminal Laws Proliferate, More 
Ensnared, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A1.  For a collection of similar cases, see, for 
example, Case Studies, OVERCRIMINALIZED.COM, http://www.overcriminalized.com/
CaseStudy.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
17 See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 
266–79 (2011). 
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space.
18
  State legislatures struggling to deal with competing fiscal priorities 
during a sustained economic downturn characterized by large budget 
deficits are in no position to grant substantial increases in funding for law 
enforcement and corrections.
19
  In this environment, states cannot afford to 
waste prosecutorial and prison resources on the sort of hypertechnical, 
“victimless” offenses that are prosecuted federally. 
Finally, even if state prosecutors were to prosecute such offenses, they 
would encounter a substantial obstacle that federal prosecutors do not: 
broadly unconstrained judicial sentencing discretion.  Most jurisdictions 
lack harsh statutory mandatory minimums and rigid sentencing mandates 
resembling the controversial federal sentencing guidelines—and, 
importantly, the federal guidelines retain much of their harsh, discretion-
constraining effect even after being declared only “advisory” in United 
States v. Booker.
20
  Thus, it is considerably more likely that the 
overcriminalization horror stories would generate significantly more lenient 
punishment if prosecuted in state court, which further reduces the incentive 
for resource-constrained state prosecutors to pursue those kinds of charges 
in the first place. 
 
18 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2010, at 34 
(Dec. 2011, rev. Feb. 9, 2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf 
(demonstrating widespread prison overcrowding nationally).  Prison overcrowding may turn 
out to be an even bigger issue for states after Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011), which 
upheld the authority of federal courts to order states to release prisoners held in 
unconstitutional conditions resulting from prison overcrowding.  As a result of Plata, 
California has been ordered to release more than 30,000 prisoners over the next two years, 
and more than a dozen other states may face similar prisoner-release orders.  See Michael 
Doyle, Ruling on Prison Overcrowding a Warning to States?, MCCLATCHY (May 24, 2011), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/05/24/114702/ruling-on-prison-overcrowding.html. 
19 A pertinent recent example comes from Indiana.  Republican Governor Mitch Daniels 
bucked opposition from Indiana prosecutors and spearheaded an effort (so far unsuccessful) 
to reduce the grades of certain nonviolent crimes and to create more effective alternatives to 
imprisonment for low-grade offenders.  He did so to fend off a projected double-digit 
percent increase in the state’s already overcrowded prison system, which would require an 
additional $1.2 billion in state spending.  See Carrie Ritchie, Nonviolent Crime Might Get 
Less Time, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 16, 2010, at B1. 
20 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  As I have explained elsewhere: “Even where there is no 
applicable statutory mandatory minimum, the ‘advisory’ guidelines powerfully constrain 
discretion.  That is because the ‘advisory’ guidelines system created by Booker exerts 
significant pressure on district judges not to impose sentences below the range recommended 
by the guidelines.”  Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 
144 (2009) (citing data showing widespread post-Booker sentencing within the guidelines 
range).  See generally Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the 
Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420 (2008) (explaining that even advisory federal 
guidelines serve to anchor federal sentences in the guidelines). 
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II. THE JUDICIAL CONTRIBUTION TO OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
Courts (and especially the federal courts) like to portray themselves as 
the victims in the vicious cycle of overcriminalization, left defenseless in 
the face of rapacious efforts by legislatures and prosecutors to use criminal 
codes for their own selfish ends.  Self-pity comes through loud and clear, 
for example, in the federal judiciary’s repeated complaint that its judges are 
overworked processing criminal cases that belong in state court.
21
  This is 
the basic story the leading lights in the academy have bought into: 
legislatures are responsible for overcriminalization because they enact so 
many criminal laws and cast them in such expansive terms, and no 
responsibility is laid at the doorstep of the judiciary.
22
  This, in my view, 
lets the courts off far easier than the facts warrant. 
Far from being innocent bystanders in overcriminalization, judges 
have been all too willing to construe ambiguous (and, at times, not-so-
ambiguous) criminal statutes expansively.  Even unelected federal judges 
enjoying life tenure seem to view themselves as having an obligation to 
ensure that morally blameworthy defendants will not slip through cracks in 
the criminal law.  In focusing on the culpability of the conduct prosecutors 
are seeking to convict, federal courts often lose sight of the proportionality 
of the penalties to which their expansive interpretations subject defendants.  
The inevitable result of how courts approach their interpretive tasks is 
broader and more punitive criminal codes. 
The following sections document, from both the quantitative and 
qualitative perspectives, the significant contribution of the federal courts to 
overcriminalization.  Even with the more than four thousand (and counting) 
criminal prohibitions Congress has enacted so far, there would still be 
significant areas of activity reserved to state law enforcement but for 
 
21 See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Congress Is Crippling Federal Courts, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B (arguing that the federal judiciary “cannot possibly 
become federal counterparts of courts of general jurisdiction, which are required to take 
virtually all kinds of cases, without seriously undermining their usefulness in performing 
their traditional role and jeopardizing those qualities that have made them special”). 
22 Professor Stuntz, for example, attributes the remarkable breadth and depth of federal 
and state criminal law to “tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of 
whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges,” who 
“cannot separate these natural allies.”  Stuntz, supra note 1, at 510; see also, e.g., Sara Sun 
Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 983 (1995) (arguing that the “explosion of new 
federal criminal statutes has serious costs” and “threatens to impair the quality of the justice 
meted out in criminal cases and significantly impairs federal judges’ ability to perform their 
core constitutional functions in civil cases”); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The 
Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1166 (1995) (“If the 
federal justice system is to function effectively and continue to dispense justice, the 
legislative and executive branches of government must exercise restraint.”). 
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expansive interpretations of ambiguities in those laws.  In these instances, 
the federal courts have dramatically broadened the scope of conduct that 
can be prosecuted federally, sometimes with surprisingly little evidence that 
Congress intended the broad interpretation, compounding the quantitative 
aspect of overcriminalization.
23
  The federal courts’ penchant for construing 
criminal statutes broadly is also problematic from the qualitative view 
because courts often override legislative grading choices—and create risks 
of disproportionately severe punishment—by expanding statutes 
prescribing higher penalties to include conduct for which less severe 
punishment is provided in other laws.  Thus, the courts have been playing 
the overcriminalization game right along with the political branches—
unwittingly, perhaps, but playing all the same—and the federal criminal 
code is as broad and harsh as it is today in large part because the federal 
courts helped make it that way.
24
 
A. EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CRIMINAL STATUTES: A 
QUANTITATIVE OBJECTION 
From the quantitative perspective, the most striking evidence of the 
judiciary’s contribution to overcriminalization comes from cases where the 
federal courts construed statutes in ways that created otherwise absent bases 
for federal prosecution.  Not surprisingly, given the steady growth of 
federal criminal law, these cases are rare.  When a type of crime is regulated 
at the federal level, there is usually a multiplicity of applicable federal 
statutes.
25
  Consequently, it will rarely be the case today that whether or not 
a particular kind of crime can be prosecuted federally will turn on the 
 
23 This phenomenon also gives rise to a critique that the courts are engaging in crime 
creation under the guise of statutory interpretation, in violation of the maxim that the 
legislature is the only appropriate body to create crimes.  See infra notes 108–14 and 
accompanying text. 
24 State courts, too, routinely broaden the reach of ambiguous criminal statutes, and so 
the same basic story could be told of the state courts.  See generally Zachary Price, The Rule 
of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 901 (2004) (noting that even in 
states where the rule of lenity, or the doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutes, is 
formally the rule, “rigorous applications of lenity are extremely rare”). 
25 Fraud is a perfect illustration:  
[T]he federal criminal code contains . . . exactly three hundred and twenty-five provisions that 
prescribe criminal penalties for fraud [or fraudulent behavior] . . . .  These frauds range in 
statutory maximum penalties from a fine of $300 or $1000 or six months’ imprisonment to 10 
years or 20 years or life.  These latter provisions are not aberrational: the federal code contains 
fifty fraud statutes that provide for a maximum penalty of ten years or more.  It also contains at 
least triple that number that are misdemeanors, with the rest obviously falling in between one and 
ten years. 
Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 249, 289–90 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
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interpretation of a single federal statute.  Nevertheless, there are some 
striking examples, and they powerfully illustrate the generative role that the 
courts have played in the federalization of crime.
26
 
1. Sex Crimes 
A well-known example is Caminetti v. United States,
27
 a case 
involving prosecutions of men for transporting their mistresses across state 
lines.  The sole basis for federal prosecution was the Mann Act, more 
formally known as the White Slave Traffic Act.  As passed in 1910, the 
Mann Act made it a federal crime to “transport[] . . . in interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or 
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.”
28
  The Act’s colorful title 
and legislative history made it clear that it was aimed at “trafficking” in 
females,
29
 but the Supreme Court construed the law as including any form 
of illicit sex, including voluntary prostitution and adultery.
30
 
The consequences of the Caminetti decision were staggering.  With 
that decision, federal prosecutors were empowered, for the first time, to use 
federal criminal law to police sexual mores throughout the nation.  Federal 
prosecutors aggressively used this new authority over the ensuing decades, 
waging what one commentator describes as a “morals crusade” against 
extramarital sex.
31





26 For a more extensive treatment of these cases, see Smith, supra note 8, at 896–908. 
27 242 U.S. 470 (1917). 
28 Ch. 395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825, 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421 
(2006)). 
29 The House Report was emphatic on the limited scope of the law:  
The legislation is needed to put a stop to a villainous interstate and international traffic in women 
and girls.  The legislation is not needed or intended as an aid to the States in the exercise of their 
police powers in the suppression or regulation of immorality in general.  It does not attempt to 
regulate the practice of voluntary prostitution, but aims solely to prevent panderers and procurers 
from compelling thousands of women and girls against their will and desire to enter into and 
continue in a life of prostitution. 
H.R. REP. NO. 61-47, at 9–10 (1910). 
30 Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485–86.  The Caminetti dissenters, by contrast, advocated a 
considerably narrower interpretation, arguing that “everybody knows that there is a 
difference between the occasional immoralities of men and women and that systematized 
and mercenary immorality epitomized in the statute’s graphic phrase ‘white-slave traffic.’  
And it was such immorality that was in the legislative mind, and not the other.”  See id. at 
502 (McKenna, J., dissenting). 
31 See DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY AND THE 
MANN ACT 139–60 (1994).  In the immediate aftermath of Caminetti (1917–1928), 
“prostitution cases were not the true focus of the federal efforts;” rather, “the targets were 
generally . . . adulterers and lovers.”  Id. at 159–60.  In 1924, for example, an incredible 70% 
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The broad interpretation adopted in Caminetti would have been 
justified if, as the majority claimed, that interpretation were compelled by 
the plain meaning of the statute.  The statute, however, was not nearly as 
plain as the majority claimed.  The conduct prohibited by the Mann Act, 
prostitution and “debauchery,” involved more than just sexual deviancy; it 
involved open and notorious sexual misconduct.
33
  This fact is highly 
significant for the stated legislative objective of protecting women from 
being “enslaved” in lives of sex trafficking. 
At the time the Mann Act was passed, women who had lost their 
reputations for “chastity” would face diminished opportunities for marriage, 
and thus might find themselves destitute.  As the moral crusaders of the day 
feared, women in these dire circumstances might be forced into lives of 
prostitution, a form of compulsory service commonly described at that time 
as a form of “slavery.”
34
  Under the familiar principle of ejusdem generis,
35
 
the Act’s catchall phrase (“any other immoral purpose”) could easily have 
been limited to the kinds of illicit sex that truly threatened to “enslave” 
women in lives of prostitution, without doing violence to the statutory text.  
The Court, however, was apparently blinded by the fact that, under the 
mores of the day, any sex outside of marriage was considered wrongful.  
Thus it endorsed the transformation of a criminal law aimed specifically at 
forced sex trafficking into a law reaching any type of sex that might be 
deemed “immoral.” 
 
of those convicted under the Mann Act were “interstate adulterers or boyfriends and 
girlfriends.”  Id. at 155.  It was not until a shift in Justice Department policy in 1962 that the 
law went “virtually unenforced in noncommercial settings, except for rape.”  Id. at 242. 
32 The Mann Act was amended in 1986, just shy of its eightieth anniversary, to make the 
statute gender-neutral and to replace the outmoded concept of “debauchery” and the catchall 
phrase with more modern language.  See Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 5(b)(1), 100 Stat. 3510, 3511 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2421 (2006)) (prohibiting interstate transportation “with intent that such individual engage 
in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal 
offense”).  In the “significant minority” of states in which adultery and other forms of 
consensual sex outside of marriage remain crimes, federal prosecutors thus retained authority 
to prosecute interstate transportation for those purposes.  Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 
84 VA. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998). 
33 See Smith, supra note 8, at 900–01. 
34 See generally LANGUM, supra note 31, at 125–27. 
35 This interpretive principle posits that where general words follow the enumeration of 
specific words in a statute, the general words are to be read as limited to the same type of 
objects as the specific words.  See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2007). 
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2. Fraud 
A more modern example of how broad interpretations of ambiguous 
criminal statutes have brought into the federal system classes of crimes that 
might otherwise have been subject to state prosecution—one which, unlike 
the Mann Act, continues to generate considerable federal enforcement 
activity today—is fraud.  The mail fraud statute was passed in 1872 to 
allow federal prosecutions of swindlers who used the mail to cheat people 
out of money or property.
36
  Congress, however, did not define “fraud,” and 
the question soon arose whether federal prosecutors could create new 
conceptions of “fraud,” unknown either to common law or state criminal 
law, as a basis for a mail fraud conviction. 
The Supreme Court answered that question in the affirmative in 
Durland v. United States.
37
  The case involved the sale of bonds on the 
basis of a false promise to repay the investment, with interest, when the 
bond matured at a future date.
38
  Although it was clear at the time that false 
promises as to future events did not constitute “fraud” (which required 
misrepresentations of existing facts), the Court held that the mail fraud 
statute was not limited to the common law definition of “fraud.”
39
  Rather, 
the statute broadly encompassed any and all deceptive means by which 
persons might be cheated out of money or property.
40
  Federal prosecutors, 
in effect, could make up their own notions of “fraud”—and, as the 
“intangible rights” cases show,
41
 there was (and is) no limit to prosecutors’ 
imagination in inventing creative new theories of “fraud.” 
Although Durland involved an effort by federal prosecutors to go 
beyond existing definitions of “fraud” under state law, the Supreme Court 
has also allowed prosecutors to use the mail fraud statute to expand upon 
prevailing federal definitions of “fraud.”  A good example is Carpenter v. 
United States.
42
  The case involved securities, mail, and wire fraud charges 
premised upon a scheme by a newspaper reporter and others to 
misappropriate from the Wall Street Journal and trade upon confidential, 
pre-publication information about publicly traded companies.
43
  It was 
unclear at the time whether such behavior constituted securities fraud 
(because the victim of the fraud, the newspaper, did not trade in the affected 
 
36 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 283, 323 (current version at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341 (2006)). 
37 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
38 Id. at 312. 
39 Id. at 313–14. 
40 Id. 
41 See infra text accompanying notes 49–56. 
42 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
43 Id. at 22–24. 
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securities), and the Carpenter Court evenly divided on that question.
44
  The 
fact that the defendants’ securities scheme might well not violate the 
securities laws did not prevent the Court from concluding, unanimously, 
that the scheme fell within the mail and wire fraud statutes.
45 
This situation is not unique to securities fraud.  By unmooring the 
definition of “fraud” from its common law origins, the federal courts have 
allowed prosecutors to charge as “fraud” activities that are regulated by, and 
possibly allowed under, bodies of law specifically regulating those 
activities, such as corporate law.  The result has been federal prosecution of 
a stunning array of misbehavior involving breaches of contract, conflicts of 
interest, ethical lapses, and violations of workplace rules that otherwise 




To be sure, the Court has occasionally been willing to limit the reach 
of the mail and wire fraud statutes.  For example, notwithstanding 
Durland’s seeming rejection of all common law limiting principles bearing 
on the meaning of “fraud,” the Court has subsequently looked to common 
law in several cases.
47 
  In none of these cases, however, did the Court 
overturn Durland or suggest that the mail fraud statute is limited to the 
common law meaning of fraud.  These efforts to impose at least some limits 
on the scope of mail and wire fraud accomplish little real restraint on the 
ability of federal prosecutors to use the mail and wire fraud statutes as 
broad tools for prosecuting any kind of wrongdoing that can be reclassified 
as “fraud.”  That is why, more than a century after its enactment, the mail 
fraud statute remains what one distinguished former prosecutor described as 




44 Id. at 24. 
45 Id. at 28.  It was not until a decade later, in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997), that such trading was held to constitute securities fraud.  Even if O’Hagan had come 
out the other way, misappropriation would still have been subject to prosecution as mail and 
wire fraud under Carpenter. 
46 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the 
Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 
19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (1981). 
47 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4 (1999) (holding that materiality is an implied 
element in prosecutions for mail fraud); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) 
(holding that the object of a scheme to defraud must be acquisition of money or property, as 
opposed to “intangible rights” such as the right to “good government” or “honest services”).  
McNally and the “intangible rights” doctrine are addressed in more detail below.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 49–56.  Similarly, in Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 15 
(2000), the Court held that government-issued licenses obtained through deceptive means do 
not count as “property” and thus cannot support mail and wire fraud charges. 
48 Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 
(1980). 
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3. State and Local Corruption 
Perhaps the most striking example of the federal courts dramatically 
extending the reach of federal criminal law involves bribery at the state and 
local level.  Although Congress has long prohibited bribery schemes 
involving federal officials,
49
 bribes involving their state and local 
counterparts were generally left to state enforcement, and the federal 
government did not, as one case put it, “set[] standards of disclosure and 
good government for local and state officials.”
50
  So far as federal law was 
concerned, state and local officials could be prosecuted for purely local 
instances of bribery only if the bribes pertained to their participation in 




The federal courts were quick to fill this gap.  From the 1940s until 
1987, the lower courts had given prosecutors free rein to prosecute bribery 
at the state and local level as “intangible rights” fraud.
52
  These cases held 
that undisclosed corruption, self-dealing, conflicts of interest, or violations 
of workplace rules by fiduciaries cheat their victims of a variety of 
“intangible rights,” such as an employer’s right to the “honest services” of 
employees or the right of voters and citizens to have elections and 
 
49 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (bribery); § 666 (federal program bribery). 
50 McNally, 483 U.S. at 360. 
51 The federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666, covers bribery by state and local 
officials if their agency “receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 
under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or 
other form of Federal assistance.”  § 666(b).  Section 201, the bribery statute applicable to 
federal officials, also applies to state and local officials to the extent they are acting as agents 
of the federal government.  See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 498–501 (1984).  
With the enactment of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006), and RICO, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961–1968 (2006), the coverage of state and local bribery was expanded as part of the 
war on organized crime.  These crimes, however, are restricted in ways that make them ill-
suited to serve as a basis for rooting out corruption within state and local government.  The 
Travel Act requires proof of a particular federal jurisdictional nexus (such as interstate 
movement, interstate telephone calls, or use of the mails) and thus does not apply to purely 
localized bribery involving state and local officials.  See § 1952(a).  As for RICO, state law 
bribery is included in the laundry list of predicate crimes that can support a racketeering 
prosecution.  See § 1961(1)(A).  Given, however, that a “pattern of racketeering” is a 
necessary element of a RICO charge, RICO cannot be used against a single act of bribery or 
even multiple episodes of bribery that are sporadic in nature.  See § 1961(5) (providing that a 
pattern of racketeering “requires at least two acts of racketeering . . . within ten years”).  In 
short, from a federal enforcement perspective, the problem with these tools for prosecuting 
state and local bribery is that they are too narrow to reach many bribery schemes. 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974); Shushan v. United 
States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941).  The “intangible rights” doctrine, though fashioned 
primarily as a basis for prosecuting governmental corruption, was also used as a basis for 
prosecuting undisclosed kickbacks and bribes involving commercial actors.  See, e.g., United 
States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973). 
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governmental affairs conducted honestly and impartially.
53
  These cases 
“substantially extended the concept of fraud” because the key element of 
deception was treated as “satisfied by nondisclosure of dishonest or corrupt 
actions, and the loss of an intangible right obviated the necessity to 
determine whether the scheme caused any economic loss.”
54
 
Although it wisely (albeit, belatedly) rejected this dramatic expansion 
of federal authority in McNally v. United States,
55
 the Supreme Court 
deserves little credit either for judicial restraint or for respecting federalism.  
After all, the Court inexplicably sat on the sidelines for almost half a 
century as corruption enforcement under the “intangible rights” doctrine 
became entrenched as a major focus of federal enforcement efforts, which 
virtually guaranteed that Congress would overturn the McNally outcome.  It 
took just a year for the Department of Justice to obtain a statute resurrecting 
the “intangible rights” doctrine and putting federal prosecutors back in the 
business of setting ethical standards for state and local officials under the 
guise of rooting out “fraud.”
56
 
Ironically, just a few years after McNally exempted state and local 
bribery from the reach of the mail fraud statute, the Court expanded a law 
carrying a considerably harsher penalty, the Hobbs Act,
57
 to encompass 
state and local bribery.  Both before McNally and after its rapid demise, 
federal prosecutors, again with the approbation of the lower courts, 
prosecuted bribery under the Hobbs Act as “extortion under color of official 
right.”
58
  In Evans v. United States,
59
 the Supreme Court endorsed this 
 
53 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 362–64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (surveying pre-McNally 
intangible-rights case law from the lower courts). 
54 NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ENFORCEMENT 132 (2000). 
55 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (holding that the necessary object of a fraudulent scheme is the 
acquisition of money or property, not “intangible rights,” from the victim through deceptive 
means). 
56 See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006) (providing that deprivations of “the intangible right of 
honest services” can constitute mail and wire fraud).  Ultimately, of course, the Supreme 
Court declared § 1346 void for vagueness as applied to conduct other than bribery and 
kickbacks.  See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2933 (2010). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006).  The Hobbs Act makes it a crime, punishable by up to twenty 
years in prison, for anyone to “affect[] commerce” in any way by means of “robbery or 
extortion.”  § 1951(a).  This penalty was considerably higher than the five-year maximum 
traditionally authorized for mail and wire fraud. 
58 “Extortion” is defined as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, 
induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of 
official right.”  § 1951(b)(2).  The first appellate case to endorse the notion that official-right 
extortion could encompass bribery was United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1972). 
59 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
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creative use of the Hobbs Act.  It did so despite the fact that, by that time, 
there was no longer any gap to fill in federal law: Congress had already 
resurrected the “intangible rights” doctrine of mail and wire fraud as a basis 
for prosecuting corrupt officials of state and local government. 
Evans, a prosecution of a county commissioner who accepted a bribe 
in connection with a local zoning matter, involved two questions.  The first 
was whether bribery could constitute extortion.  The second was whether 
the reference to “inducement” in the statutory definition of extortion 
precluded prosecution where the public official passively accepted (and 
thus did not affirmatively induce payment of) a bribe.  The Court resolved 
both questions in favor of the government.
60
 
What is so striking about the case is the lengths to which the majority 
went to expand the reach of the Hobbs Act.  The common law treatment of 
extortion and bribery, which the majority and dissent debated at length, was 
unclear at best and thus did not compel the majority to treat passive 
acceptance of a bribe as a form of extortion.
61
  Indeed, the definition of 
extortion expressly states that the victim’s consent to surrendering money 
or property has to be “induced” by some action on the part of the 
extortionist—namely, “force, violence, or fear, or . . . color of official 
right.”
62
  To say the least, the requirement of inducement does not easily 




60 See id. at 260 (concluding that “[e]xtortion by the public official was the rough 
equivalent of what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe’”); id. at 266–68 (ruling that 
acceptance of an unsolicited bribe constitutes extortion under color of official right). 
61 Compare id. at 269–71, with id. at 280–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Noting that there 
were “substantial arguments” on both sides of that debate, Justice O’Connor sensibly 
declined to take a position on the relationship between extortion and bribery at common law.  
Id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  To be sure, 
Congress is presumed to intend the common law meaning when it uses a common law term.  
That presumption, however, only makes sense if the term had an established meaning in the 
common law. 
62 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
63 The inducement requirement does, however, make sense in the broader context of 
robbery and the other offenses created by the Hobbs Act.  These offenses, without exception, 
require active use by the defendant of wrongful, coercive means to obtain the victim’s 
money or property.  Robbery requires the defendant to use “actual or threatened force, or 
violence, or fear of injury,” § 1951(b)(1), just as extortion requires the use of “force, 
violence, or fear,” § 1951(b)(2).  The point is even clearer with the other crime created by 
the Hobbs Act, for the defendant must “commit[] or threaten[] physical violence to any 
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this 
section.”  § 1951(a).  Seen in light of these other Hobbs Act offenses, it only made sense to 
treat extortion under color of official right as involving a different kind of wrongful 
coercion—namely, the power of public office—to compel people to surrender their money 
or property. 
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Not to be prevented from reaching its preferred result, the majority 
gutted the inducement requirement.  In its view, the inducement 
requirement either did not apply to extortion under color of official right or, 
if it did, “the wrongful acceptance of a bribe establishes all the inducement 
that the statute requires.”
64
  No claim was made (or could have been made) 
that the Evans outcome was compelled by text or legislative intent.  The 
Court simply deemed bribe-taking to be deserving of punishment and 
stretched the concepts of “extortion” and “inducement” under the Hobbs 
Act to create an independent basis for punishment in federal court. 
4. Synthesis 
The cases discussed in this section show that those who object to the 
broad scope of federal criminal law should not direct their complaints solely 
at Congress.  Needless to say, Congress has passed an astonishing number 
of criminal statutes, but this flurry of legislative activity does not fully 
account for the federalization of crime.  Time and again, the federal 
courts—from the Supreme Court down to the lower courts—have taken 
ambiguous (and, in the case of the Hobbs Act, not-so-ambiguous) criminal 
statutes and dramatically expanded their reach.  As a result of their almost 
Pavlovian penchant for broadly construing federal criminal laws, whole 
areas of federal law that otherwise would be largely or entirely beyond the 
reach of federal prosecutors have been swept within the federal enforcement 
apparatus.  Therefore, if federal criminal law is too broad in its reach, as so 
many rightly believe, federal judges share in the blame for that unfortunate 
state of affairs. 
B. EXPANSIVE CONSTRUCTIONS OF CRIMINAL STATUTES: 
A QUALITATIVE OBJECTION 
The previous section dealt with situations in which federal courts 
broadly construed criminal statutes to create new avenues for federal 
prosecution and conviction.  This section deals with the same basic problem 
in a far more common situation: overlapping federal criminal statutes 
prescribing different penalties for a particular kind of crime.  It is, of course, 
to be conceded at the outset that some degree of redundancy across crimes 
is inevitable and unobjectionable.
65
  Nevertheless, the rampant redundancy 
 
64 Evans, 504 U.S. at 266. 
65 For example, physical attack that can be prosecuted as assault and battery can also 
constitute homicide if death results.  Although these crimes overlap, they protect victim 
interests of differing weight, and the penal consequences of prosecuting a fatal beating as 
murder instead of assault, though dramatic, are justified by the fact that death resulted and by 
the defendant’s seriously culpable state of mind in inflicting the beating. 
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of federal criminal law is problematic when courts allow prosecutors to 
exploit the situation to redefine federal crimes and to drive up the penalties 
Congress prescribed for a particular crime. 
All too frequently, courts have either created or exacerbated 
redundancies across criminal statutes by broadly construing generic federal 
statutes carrying higher penalties to encompass conduct that is subject to 
lower penalties under more specific federal statutes.
66
  In these contexts, the 
incremental punishment is determined solely by an arbitrary factor—
namely, the prosecutor’s choice as to which statute to proceed under
67
— 
rather than differences in culpability or a considered legislative judgment 
that higher penalties are warranted for that type of behavior. 
Needless to say, the pervasive problem of overlapping federal crimes 
was not, strictly speaking, created by the federal courts.  The prime culprit 
is Congress, and the root of the problem is that there are just too many 
different federal statutes on the books regulating fraud and other 
misdeeds—or so it would appear.  On closer inspection, however, this is yet 
another example of courts taking a bad situation created by Congress and 
making it even worse.  The multiplicity of overlapping crimes is not 
problematic in itself, nor is it necessarily problematic that such overlapping 
crimes may be defined or punished differently.  If, for example, courts held 
that prosecutors must use the most specific of overlapping statutes, it would 
be irrelevant whether there is just one applicable statute on the books or 
dozens (or, in the case of federal fraud laws, hundreds). 
Major problems have arisen in the context of overlapping criminal 
statutes only because of how courts have responded to this situation.  Where 
such overlap exists, courts have held that, absent either a double-jeopardy 
violation or specific legislative intent to make a particular crime exclusive 
of other crimes, prosecutors are free to pick and choose among the 
 
66 See infra text accompanying notes 69–100. 
67 In those circumstances, prosecutors will naturally charge the offense carrying the 
highest penalty regardless of whether that sanction is commensurate, morally speaking, with 
the defendant’s culpability.  Indeed, they are required to do so by Department of Justice 
policy: “It is the policy of the Department of Justice that, in all federal criminal cases, federal 
prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses 
that are supported by the facts of the case . . . .  The most serious offense or offenses are 
those that generate the most substantial sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, unless a 
mandatory minimum sentence or count requiring a consecutive sentence would generate a 
longer sentence.”  Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft to All Federal 
Prosecutors, Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of 
Charges, and Sentencing 2 (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm.  This so-called “Ashcroft Memorandum” allows 
exceptions in certain enumerated “limited circumstances” (such as the defendant having 
assisted prosecutors in the apprehension of other suspects), but only with prior approval of 
designated Justice Department superiors.  Id. 
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applicable statutes as they see fit.
68
  As with so many other features of 
federal criminal law, the redundancy of the federal criminal code translates 
into more lawmaking and sentencing power for prosecutors—and even 
greater leverage to extract guilty pleas from defendants.  Prosecutors can 
use their power to select the applicable charge from among overlapping 
statutes to evade express limitations in the definition of crimes and to 
ratchet up the punishment that convicted defendants face. 
The following subsections explore these two ways in which federal 
courts have allowed prosecutors to exploit overcriminalization to their own 
advantage. 
1. Redefinition of Crimes 
Fraud offenses illustrate how courts have allowed prosecutors to use 
redundancies across federal statutes to redefine crimes.  One example, 
already discussed, is Carpenter v. United States.
69
  Even though it was 
doubtful at the time that buying securities based on confidential information 
misappropriated from a third party constituted securities fraud, prosecutors 
were able to obtain a fraud conviction anyway.  All they had to do was add 
to their dubious securities fraud charge mail and wire fraud charges based 
on the distribution of the newspaper from which the confidential 
information was stolen.  The effect on the outcome in Carpenter was 
dramatic: the Justices divided four to four on whether to uphold the 
securities fraud conviction, but unanimously held the defendants guilty of 
mail and wire fraud.
70 
Credit-card fraud is another example of how mail and wire fraud can 
be used to redefine other crimes.  The credit-card fraud statute does not 
permit federal prosecution unless the fraud exceeds a specific monetary 
amount.
71
  Presumably Congress imposed a monetary limit to prevent 
prosecutors from making a “federal case” out of small-scale frauds 
involving credit cards.  Credit-card authorization and billing, however, 
invariably involves some use of the mails and interstate wires.  As such, 
 
68 The Supreme Court has “long recognized that when an act violates more than one 
criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not 
discriminate against any class of defendants.”  United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 
123–24 (1979).  Batchelder held that, even when there are multiple federal laws aimed at 
precisely the same criminal act, prosecutors can elect to use the harsher of the two laws.  Id.; 
see also, e.g., United States v. Computer Scis. Corp., 689 F.2d 1181 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that prosecutors can proceed under the mail and wire fraud statutes for conduct that falls 
within the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2006)). 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 42–45. 
70 Compare Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), with id. at 28. 
71 The current monetary limit for most purposes is $1,000 in any given year.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1644(a), (d), (f) (2006). 
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prosecutors can evade the monetary limit imposed by Congress by 
prosecuting fraudulent uses of credit cards below the limit as mail or wire 
fraud instead of credit-card fraud.
72
 
2. Potentially Disproportionate Punishment 
i. RICO 
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)
73
 
was passed in 1970 to give federal prosecutors more effective tools for 
eradicating organized crime.  The purpose of the statute is clear: to protect 
“enterprises” against being infiltrated and put to criminal uses by organized 
crime.  That explains why the commission of racketeering crimes does not 
violate RICO unless it is directed against an “enterprise” or involves the use 
of an “enterprise” to commit a pattern of racketeering activity.
74
  The clear 
implication is that the “enterprise” was and, apart from the intervention of 
organized crime, would have remained a legitimate organization existing 
for commercial or other lawful purposes. 
Nevertheless, in United States v. Turkette,
75
 the Supreme Court 
endorsed efforts by the Justice Department to turn RICO on its head.  
Prosecutors argued that an associated-in-fact RICO “enterprise” could be a 
crime family or gang, in which case mere participation in the nefarious 
affairs of the group would violate RICO, quite apart from efforts to 
 
72 In United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974), the Court recognized that, even after 
enactment of the credit-card fraud statute, the fraudulent use of credit cards could be 
prosecuted as mail fraud.  In fact, Chief Justice Warren Burger’s dissent specifically 
endorsed the use of the mail fraud statute to skirt restrictions contained in more specific 
fraud statutes.  Id. at 406 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The mail fraud statute continues to 
remain an important tool in prosecuting frauds in those areas where legislation has been 
passed more directly addressing the fraudulent conduct.”). 
73 18 U.S.C. § 1961–1968 (2006). 
74 Subsections 1962(a), (b), and (d) prohibit racketeers from using (or conspiring to use) 
the methods of organized crime, or money generated through such methods, to gain a 
toehold in an “enterprise,” and subsection (c) is the completed offense in which the 
“enterprise” has already not only been infiltrated but also corrupted by being used to commit 
a pattern of racketeering activity.  § 1962(a)–(d).  The “infiltration” understanding of RICO 
is made explicit in the statute’s preamble, which declares that RICO was intended to stop the 
“money and power” of “organized crime” from being “used to infiltrate and corrupt 
legitimate business and labor unions.”  Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-452, pmbl., 84 Stat. 922, 923.  The legislative history supports this view: “[N]owhere in 
the legislative history is there even a glimmer of an indication that RICO or any of its 
predecessors was intended to impose additional criminal sanctions on racketeering acts that 
did not involve infiltration into legitimate business.”  Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of 
Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661, 680 (1987). 
75 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
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infiltrate legitimate businesses or groups.  Turkette endorsed this innovative 
use of RICO, and did so precisely because a contrary result would leave 
“[w]hole areas of organized criminal activity . . . beyond the substantive 
reach of the enactment.”
76
 
The result in Turkette may seem unassailable, but only if the issue is 
viewed solely in terms of culpability.  The balance tips in favor of the 
opposite result when proportionality of punishment is considered.  The 
import of Turkette is that crooks who get together to commit at least two of 
a wide variety of crimes under state or federal law can constitute a RICO 
“enterprise” and can be convicted under RICO even if they do nothing to 
infiltrate a legitimate business.  That holding, though just as applied to 
organized criminals, creates the danger that garden-variety conspiracies can 
be prosecuted as RICO violations.  This is so because a conspiracy is 
simply an agreement between two or more people to commit, or assist in 
the commission of, any crime or series of crimes.
77
  Given the breadth of 
the predicate crimes that trigger RICO (particularly mail and wire fraud), 
Turkette threw open the door to RICO prosecutions for innumerable 
conspiracies that otherwise would be prosecuted under ordinary conspiracy 
law. 
The penal effects of allowing RICO to subsume conspiracy law are 
enormous.  Under the federal conspiracy statute, the maximum penalty for 
conspiring to commit a federal crime is five years.
78
  RICO, however, 
allows up to twenty years in prison for each substantive violation and for 
each conspiracy to violate RICO.
79
  The reason that RICO carries such 
heavy penalties is obvious: Congress knew that organized crime is, for a 
variety of reasons—including its highly structured nature, its continuity, the 
vast economic resources at its disposal, and its tendency to expand into 
legitimate sectors of the economy—far more dangerous than ordinary 
criminal conspiracies (such as a stick-up man and the getaway-car driver 
who rob a couple of banks).  Allowing ordinary conspiracies to be charged 
as RICO violations, however, subjects ordinary conspiracies involving 
almost any kind of serious crime (and a number of comparatively minor 
felonies as well) to the same draconian penalty that Congress crafted for 
organized crime.  Therefore, Turkette created a serious problem of 




76 Id. at 589. 
77 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1962). 
78 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006). 
79 See § 1963(a).  The twenty-year maximum becomes life imprisonment in the event any 
racketeering activity committed is punishable by life imprisonment.  Id. 
80 Indeed, the danger of disproportionate punishment was present in Turkette itself.  As 
Professor (now Judge) Gerard Lynch explains: 
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To its credit, beginning in Turkette itself, the Supreme Court tried to 
ameliorate the problem it created of associated-in-fact “enterprises” 
swallowing up ordinary conspiracies,
81
 but, true to form, the Court 
eventually gave up on those efforts and returned to its crime-expanding, 
punishment-enhancing ways.  In Boyle v. United States, the defendant 
argued that juries must be instructed that an associated-in-fact RICO 
“enterprise” cannot be found unless, as Turkette itself had suggested, it had 
some type of ascertainable structure beyond the bare minimum necessary to 
commit the predicate crimes.
82
  The Court disagreed, emphasizing the 




The Court’s sweeping discussion in Boyle not only makes no pretense 
that a RICO “enterprise” must be more than a conspiracy.  It virtually 
concedes that proof of a conspiracy provides sufficient evidence of an 
associated-in-fact “enterprise.”  Using reasoning that at times bordered on 
sophistry, the majority claimed that such an “enterprise” must indeed have 
some sort of structure, but ruled that juries cannot be instructed as to the 
type or degree of structure that counts, leaving juries almost no alternative 
but to infer the necessary (but undefined) structure from the bare fact that 
the members of the alleged “enterprise” acted in concert.
84
  The dissent was 
 
Granted that Turkette himself had made crime into a full-time livelihood, his ‘organization’ 
seems to have consisted of a couple of people with whom he committed robberies from time to 
time, and a few others he recruited to help when he was asked to arrange a few fires.  It is not 
immediately clear why Turkette and his cronies should be subject to any greater punishment . . . 
[than] any other criminals guilty of multiple crimes. 
Lynch, supra note 74, at 705 (footnote omitted). 
81 In dictum the lower courts would later find to be significant in the effort to limit RICO 
liability to acceptable bounds, Turkette declared that the enterprise “is proved by evidence of 
an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates 
[comprising the enterprise] function as a continuing unit.”  Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.  In 
several cases, the Court added that the “pattern of racketeering” essential to a valid RICO 
charge cannot be shown simply by proving two or more racketeering crimes were committed 
within ten years.  A valid “pattern” also requires proof of “continuity” (that the scheme 
lasted or would have lasted for an extended period of time) and that the racketeering 
activities bore some “relationship” to each other (such as manner of commission, intended 
victims, or purpose).  See H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (reading 
“continuity” and “relationship” requirements into the definition of “pattern”); Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (suggesting that two acts of 
racketeering may not be enough to constitute a “pattern”). 
82 556 U.S. 938, 947–48 (2009). 
83 Id. at 944; see also id. at 950 (emphasizing the “clear but expansive text of the 
statute”). 
84 Id. at 945–49.  Tellingly, although the majority found it “easy to envision situations in 
which proof that individuals engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity would not establish 
the existence of an enterprise,” id. at 947 n.4, it offered only one.  That lone example is 
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thus exactly right in its claims that the majority “render[ed] the enterprise 
requirement essentially meaningless in association-in-fact cases” and made 
RICO violations “indistinguishable from conspiracies to commit predicate 
acts.”
85
  With Boyle, the danger of disproportionate punishment that arose in 
Turkette from allowing RICO to be used when the “enterprise” is a group of 
individuals associated to commit crimes is now complete: so far as the law 
of RICO is concerned, prosecutors have free rein to use RICO to ratchet up 
the five-year maximum punishment under 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracies 
to commit federal crimes to the much higher punishments RICO affords. 
ii. Bribery, Gratuities, and Extortion 
The application of the Hobbs Act to bribery has already been 
discussed at some length and thus can be treated briefly here.
86
  Recall that, 
in Evans v. United States,
87
 the Supreme Court held that state and local 
bribery can constitute extortion under color of official right.  That holding 
produced a significant effect on the punishment of such bribery, which had 
a five-year maximum (if prosecuted as “intangible rights” fraud) but, as 
extortion, had a maximum punishment of twenty years.
88
 
In addition, Evans brought a whole category of corruption that 
Congress graded as far less culpable than bribery or extortion—namely, 
illegal-gratuities offenses—into the Hobbs Act under the rubric of 
“bribery.”  Under the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, the receipt of 
 
where “several individuals, independently and without coordination, engage[] in a pattern of 
crimes listed as RICO predicates.”  Id.  This is significant because it is only without the 
coordination and shared purpose that conspirators necessarily have that the majority could 
claim that individuals committing racketeering crimes do not constitute a RICO “enterprise.”  
With the common purpose and coordination that inheres in the very notion of a conspiracy, 
the conspirators are easily (if not invariably) classified as an associated-in-fact “enterprise” 
under Boyle. 
85 Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
86 See supra notes 57–64 and accompanying text. 
87 504 U.S. 255 (1992). 
88 Less dramatic, but nonetheless troubling, is the effect Evans had on the penalty for 
bribery involving federal officials.  If the federal bribery statute was the sole basis for 
prosecuting bribery at the federal level, the maximum punishment available would be fifteen 
years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).  Under Evans, however, bribery involving federal 
officials can be charged as extortion under color of official right under the Hobbs Act, which 
carries a maximum of twenty years imprisonment.  E.g., United States v. Stephenson, 895 
F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990).  Allowing federal officials to be prosecuted for extortion under 
color of official right under the Hobbs Act produces yet another strange result: the penalty 
for such extortion by federal officials, which otherwise would be three years, increases 
almost seven-fold to twenty years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 872 (“Whoever, being an officer, or 
employee of the United States or any department or agency thereof, . . . under color or 
pretense of office or employment commits or attempts an act of extortion, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both . . . .”). 
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illegal gratuities is sharply distinguished from, and graded as far less 
culpable than, bribery.  Bribery requires a quid pro quo, understood as a 
corrupt effort to trade on public office, whereas illegal gratuities may reflect 
nothing more than compensation from unauthorized sources for acts 
performed in the honest exercise of public office.
89
  The penalties that § 201 
provides for the two distinct offenses clearly reflect the greater seriousness 
of bribery as compared to illegal-gratuities offenses: bribery is punishable 
by up to fifteen years, roughly eight times the two-year maximum for 
illegal-gratuities offenses, and permanent disqualification from future 
federal office.
90
  Accordingly, Congress clearly viewed illegal-gratuities 
offenses as distinct from, and far less blameworthy than, bribery. 
Evans obliterated the distinction between the two crimes and, in doing 
so, subjected illegal-gratuities offenses to the severe punishment Congress 
reserved for bribery.  While paying lip service to the quid pro quo 
requirement as a defining feature of bribery, the Evans majority diluted that 
vital requirement.  Under federal bribery statutes, the quid pro quo 
requirement mandates proof of “specific intent to give or receive something 
of value in exchange for an official act.”
91
  No such specific intent, 
however, is required under Evans.  The Court was explicit on this point: 
“We hold today that the Government need only show that a public official 
has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the 
payment was made in return for official acts.”
92
 
The phrasing of the knowledge requirement is key because it simply 
restates the mens rea standard for illegal-gratuities offenses under § 201(c).  
A violation of the illegal-gratuities law “requires the presence of three 
separate elements: that the defendant (i) knowingly gave a thing of value; 
(ii) to a public official or person selected to be a public official; (iii) for or 
because of any official act performed or to be performed.”
93
  The Evans 
 
89 The Supreme Court has explained the distinction between the two crimes in the 
following terms: 
Bribery requires intent “to influence” an official act or “to be influenced” in an official act, while 
illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted “for or because of” an official 
act.  In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive 
something of value in exchange for an official act.  An illegal gratuity, on the other hand, may 
constitute merely a reward for some future act that the public official will take (and may already 
have determined to take), or for a past act that he has already taken. 
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b) (bribery); § 201(c) (gratuities)). 
90 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (bribery), with § 201(c) (gratuities). 
91 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404–05. 
92 Evans, 504 U.S. at 268. 
93 United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, 240 
F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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definition of extortion under color of official right is indistinguishable from 
the typical formulation of the illegal-gratuities offense.  In both cases, the 
specific intent “‘to be influenced’ in an official act” necessary for a bribery 
conviction is conspicuously absent.
94
  The lack of intent to be influenced 
makes sense for gratuities offenses because, as one treatise notes, the 
“gravamen” of such offenses is “not an intent to be corrupted or influenced, 
but simply the acceptance of an unauthorized compensation.”
95
  It makes no 
sense, however, for bribery, the whole point of which is to punish corrupt 
bargains in which official acts are traded for private gain. 
This nonsensical result is exactly what Evans allows.  As lower courts 
have recognized, public officials who accept payments from private parties 
can be convicted under the Evans standard even absent proof that the 
officials intended to be influenced in an official act.
96
  In other words, 
Evans allows conviction under the Hobbs Act not just for bribery, but also 
for what amounts to an illegal-gratuities offense. 
The sentencing consequences of Evans are, by any measure, dramatic.  
By expanding extortion under color of official right to include illegal-
gratuities offenses, the Court subjected gratuities offenses to the same 
punishment as bribery under the Hobbs Act.  This is directly contrary to 
Congress’s assessment, as reflected in the federal bribery law, that gratuities 
offenses are far less culpable than bribery.  Moreover, allowing gratuities 
offenses to be prosecuted as extortion produces a ten-fold increase in the 
maximum punishment Congress provided under the federal illegal-
gratuities statute for the same conduct.  Gratuities offenses are subject to a 
two-year maximum under § 201(c) but twenty years under the Hobbs Act as 
construed in Evans.  These substantial increases in punishment all stem 
from the expansion of the Hobbs Act to include voluntary wealth transfers 
 
94 Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 404. 
95 SARAH N. WELLING ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND RELATED ACTIONS: CRIMES, 
FORFEITURE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RICO § 7.4, at 216 (1998). 
96 After surveying the case law on this point, the Seventh Circuit concluded: 
We therefore join the circuits that require a quid pro quo showing in all [Hobbs Act] cases 
[involving payments to public officials].  That said, we also agree . . . that the government need 
not show an explicit agreement, but only that the payment was made in return for official acts—
that the public official understood that as a result of the payment he was expected to exercise 
particular kinds of influence on behalf of the payor. 
United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 2001).  Of course, as an evidentiary 
matter, intent to be influenced might be inferred from proof that an official accepted a 
payment with knowledge that it was offered for or because of a future official act, but, absent 
such an inference, such proof alone would be insufficient to convict for bribery.  Under 
Evans, however, such proof is itself a sufficient basis for conviction, and lack of intent on the 
part of the official to be influenced is no defense. 
562 STEPHEN F. SMITH [Vol. 102 
to public officials instead of restricting the statute to transfers that the 
public official coerced through misuse of the power of public office. 
iii. Mail and Wire Fraud 
For almost a century, the penalty for mail and wire fraud was no more 
than five years imprisonment.  That changed in the wake of recent corporate 
accounting scandals.  In 2002, Congress increased the punishment for both 
offenses to twenty years.
97
  The substantial increase in penalty gives 
prosecutors powerful new incentives to use the mail and wire fraud statutes 
to ratchet up the punishment offenders would face under other federal fraud 
statutes. 
Few federal anti-fraud statutes carry penalties as severe as mail and 
wire fraud now do, and a good number of those statutes provide for 
considerably lower penalties.  Conspiracies to defraud the United States are 
punishable by five years maximum, as is the filing of false or fraudulent 
claims with federal agencies.
98
  The maximum punishment for credit-card 
fraud and health-care fraud is ten years.
99
  In all of these cases (and many 
more),
100
 prosecutors can, simply by charging mail and wire fraud 
violations, drive up the maximum punishment defendants would otherwise 
face under federal statutes dealing with their specific kind of fraudulent 
activity. 
3. Synthesis 
As the above discussion shows, overlapping criminal statutes are 
commonplace in the federal system.  That is Congress’s fault.  Courts, 
however, are to blame for allowing federal prosecutors carte blanche to 
exploit rampant redundancies in federal criminal law in ways that redefine 
crimes, allowing prosecutors to sidestep express limitations Congress 
prescribed for certain crimes, and to ratchet up the maximum punishment 
defendants face upon conviction.  These results are possible only because of 
judicial choices—namely, choices not to treat specific offenses as exclusive 
of generic crimes but to construe more severely punished generic crimes to 
encompass crimes for which Congress specifically provided lower 
 
97 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 903, 116 Stat. 745, 805 
(amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 to increase the five-year maximum for mail and wire 
fraud).  The legislation also made securities fraud a twenty-year offense.  § 1106 (amending 
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)). 
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false claims); § 371 (conspiracy). 
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (credit-card fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (health-care fraud). 
100 The discussion so far has centered on some of the more frequently used fraud statutes, 
but this is just the tip of the iceberg because there are literally hundreds of anti-fraud 
provisions in federal criminal law.  See Standen, supra note 25, at 289–90. 
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punishment.  In other contexts, courts have adopted exclusivity principles 
designed to prevent such end-running of congressional intent,
101 
but not in 
the case of overlapping crimes.  Again, courts have joined with Congress in 
making federal criminal law harsher than necessary. 
It is puzzling that courts have been so willing to allow prosecutors to 
exploit the redundancies in federal criminal law in ways that override 
specific congressional choices as to the proper definition of crimes and the 
proper penalty for a criminal act.  A bedrock principle of American criminal 
justice is legislative supremacy—the idea that it is for legislatures, not 
courts or law enforcement, to define what is a crime (and, in doing so, to 
prescribe the appropriate penalty).
102
  From the vantage point of legislative 
supremacy, the courts’ hands-off approach to redundancy in criminal law 
seems profoundly misguided.  If Congress truly is to be supreme in matters 
 
101 For instance, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Court held that the 
federal cause of action against state actors for infringements of federally guaranteed rights, 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), cannot be used by state prisoners to obtain release from 
imprisonment in lieu of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255 (2006).  
Despite the “literal applicability” of § 1983, the habeas statute “must be understood to be the 
exclusive remedy” for state prisoners challenging the fact or duration of their incarceration.  
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 489.  Otherwise, prisoners could, simply by suing under § 1983 
instead of the habeas statute, evade the express statutory requirement that habeas petitioners 
must exhaust available state-court remedies before challenging their convictions in federal 
court.  Similarly, in Great Am. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, the Court held that a 
Reconstruction-era statute parallel to § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006), cannot be used to 
enforce rights conferred by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  442 U.S. 366, 378 
(1979).  Title VII remedies must be treated as exclusive of § 1985(3) as a means of enforcing 
Title VII rights, Novotny held, because § 1985(3) would empower Title VII plaintiffs to 
“avoid most if not all of the[] detailed and specific provisions” of Title VII.  442 U.S. at 
375–76.  These cases reflect a longstanding principle of statutory interpretation: “As always, 
‘[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or 
nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of the enactment.’”  Crawford Fitting 
Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (quoting Radzanower v. Touche Ross & 
Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
102 This notion inheres in the “principle of legality.”  As one leading scholar summarizes 
the concept: “The principle of legality . . . stands for the desirability in principle of advance 
legislative specification of criminal misconduct.”  John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, 
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 190 (1985).  
Although legality is often understood merely as a rejection of judicial crime creation, the 
principle reflects the broader notion, in Jeffries’s words, that only legislatures are “politically 
competent to define crime.”  Id.; see also, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 
(1971) (stating that “because criminal punishment usually represents the moral 
condemnation of the community, legislatures . . . should define criminal activity”).  So 
understood, allowing law enforcement agents to decide what is or is not a crime is just as 
offensive to the principle of legality as judicial crime creation.  Support for the broader 
understanding of legality can be found in its “operational arm,” Jeffries, supra at 196, the 
void-for-vagueness doctrine, which aims to prevent legislatures from using vague criminal 
statutes to delegate lawmaking power to police and prosecutors.  See generally id. at 196–97. 
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of substantive federal criminal law, prosecutors should not be allowed to 
exploit the existence of overlapping crimes to override specific 
congressional policy judgments about the scope of—or proper penalty for—
particular crimes. 
The courts’ approach to redundancies across federal criminal statutes 
becomes more understandable when viewed, as the courts evidently view it, 
solely in terms of culpability.  Given the courts’ reluctance to let fraud or 
other culpable behavior slip through the federal cracks, it makes sense that 
they would allow prosecutors to use broadly worded crimes, like mail and 
wire fraud, to avoid what might be called “near misses”: situations where 
Congress has criminalized a particular form of behavior, but defined it in 
ways that allow some morally equivalent kind of behavior to escape 
prosecution under a particular statute.  Once Congress has criminalized an 
act, signaling its determination that the behavior is sufficiently 
blameworthy to warrant federal prosecution, arguably no real harm is done 
if prosecutors use other criminal statutes to go after the same act or similar 
kinds of acts.  Regardless of which statute is being used, the key point, from 
a culpability standpoint, is that prosecutors are pursuing acts that Congress 
deemed (or would have deemed) culpable. 
It should now be clear that it is unsound to focus solely on the 
culpability of the behavior the prosecutor seeks to prosecute.  The penal 
consequences must also be factored into the analysis.  This additional 
consideration makes the case for exclusivity significantly stronger.  Even if 
there is nothing wrong in principle with allowing prosecutors to use generic 
crimes to get around limitations written into a particular kind of crime, it 
makes little sense to allow prosecutors to exploit the redundancy of the 
criminal law to drive up significantly the punishment that a defendant 
would otherwise face for the same criminal act.
103
  To do so, as courts do all 
 
103 Importantly, the federal sentencing guidelines do not solve this problem.  The 
guidelines do nothing at all about situations where an overlapping generic crime carries a 
mandatory minimum that the more specific crime does not.  In this circumstance (which 
cannot be ignored given the proliferation of mandatory minimums throughout federal 
criminal law, see infra note 147 and accompanying text), the prosecutor’s ability to convict 
under the generic crime would strip judges of the latitude they would have had under the 
specific statute to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum.  In other cases, where 
the difference between the generic and specific statutes lies in the maximum punishment, it 
is true that similar offenses are grouped together rather than processed under separate 
guidelines.  So, for example, whether a public official is convicted of bribery under the 
federal bribery statute (which carries a fifteen-year maximum), 18 U.S.C. § 201, or of the 
same conduct as official-right extortion (which carries a twenty-year maximum under the 
Hobbs Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the same sentencing guideline applies.  In either case, the 
defendant starts out, for sentencing purposes, with a base offense level of fourteen.  See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.1(a)(1) (2010).  It would be wrong, however, to 
conclude that the choice of statute is irrelevant to sentencing.  The higher statutory 
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the time, allows prosecutors to undermine one of the most basic policy 
determinations Congress makes when passing crimes—the severity of 
punishment convicted offenders potentially deserve—and contributes to the 
already considerable harshness of the federal criminal code. 
III. A QUALITATIVE CRITIQUE OF OVERCRIMINALIZATION IN FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
The main problem with overcriminalization is that it results in crimes 
that are often (if not usually) poorly defined—and poorly defined in ways 
that exacerbate their already considerable breadth and punitiveness, 
maximize prosecutorial power, and undermine the goal of providing fair 
warning of the acts that can lead to criminal liability.  Even if the number of 
crimes remains constant or continues to grow (which appears probable, if 
not inevitable), overcriminalization need not be the complete disaster that 
its many critics believe it to be.  A body of federal criminal law that 
contains too many prohibitions and is too broad in scope can be improved 
immeasurably by remedying its many qualitative deficiencies. 
One such deficiency—which some might understandably regard as the 
most significant—is the enormous overlap across federal criminal statutes, 
which typically results in inconsistent crime definition and offense grading.  
Having already discussed this issue in Part II,
104
 the discussion here 
addresses other qualitative deficiencies in federal criminal law.  These 
include: the poor organization of federal criminal statutes, sloppy legislative 
crime definition (which results in judicial crime creation), the inadequacy of 
federal mens rea requirements, and the paucity of defenses.  Together, these 
features of federal criminal law make overcriminalization more than just 
troublesome in theory, but unacceptable in practice as well. 
A. A “CODE” IN NAME ONLY 
A major problem with federal criminal law, quite simply, is that we do 
not have a “federal criminal code” in any recognizable sense of the phrase.  
A “code” is a systematic body of laws that is organized into a coherent and 
 
maximum under the Hobbs Act, coupled with the breadth of the “relevant conduct” that goes 
into federal sentences, means that an official convicted of bribery under the Hobbs Act could 
receive a sentence in excess of the fifteen years authorized by § 201.  The greater the 
differences in the relevant statutory maximums, the more likely it is that the ultimate 
sentence will exceed the lower one based on relevant conduct and other sentence 
enhancements.  The ability of sentence enhancements to generate sentences at even high 
statutory maximums is shown most strikingly by federal fraud and drug offenses, where 
amount of loss and drug quantity, respectively, routinely generate enormous increases in 
sentences. 
104 See supra notes 65–103 and accompanying text. 
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cohesive whole.
105
  That characterization does not even remotely fit the 
hodgepodge we refer to as “federal criminal law.” 
Although Title 18 of the United States Code is entitled “Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure,” the roster of federal crimes is not contained in that or 
any other single title of the Code.  Instead, they are scattered throughout the 
dozens of titles of the Code.  That might not be a serious defect if the 
crimes were carefully organized and comprehensively indexed, but that is 
not the case. 
As one participant in prior federal criminal law reform efforts has 
explained: 
[T]he accumulated ad hoc enactments appear in a uniquely unhelpful arrangement.  
They are clumped together in a series of chapters bearing titles apparently chosen by 
lexicographers rather than lawyers versed in the penal law, and are laid out in 
alphabetical order of their titles (Aircraft and Motor Vehicles; Animals, Birds, Fish, 
and Plants; Arson; Assault; etc.) rather than by concept.  Individual provisions have 
proven to be so difficult to find that, until a change in type fonts several years ago, the 
paperback edition of Title 18 consisted of approximately 500 pages of statutory text, 
and, in a vain attempt to provide the reader with some rough idea of the contents, 300 
pages of an index.
106
 
This state of affairs is unacceptable for several reasons.  First, it makes 
it difficult for even specialists in criminal law to find the law, much less 
ordinary citizens trying to determine their legal obligations.  This frustrates 
both the rule-of-law imperative that the criminal law should be accessible to 
the public so they can conform their behavior to it and potentially the notion 
that it is unfair to punish absent fair warning.  Second, it complicates the 
task of effective crime definition.  With such poor organization, it is no 
surprise that federal criminal law contains scores of overlapping crimes that 





105 This is the very premise of the civil law tradition and of Anglo-American codification 
efforts dating back to Jeremy Bentham (who is widely credited with coining the term 
“codification”).  See generally Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 765, 772 (2004) (explaining that the Benthamite, civil-law vision of law demands 
that legal rules be “set forth in advance in an accessible and precise canonical text which is 
expected to provide a clear . . . resolution of the vast majority of legal questions and human 
controversies”).  Bentham himself argued that codes should be written and organized in the 
way that would be “best adapted for the generality of the people” and “most easily 
understood by the least skilful.”  Jeremy Bentham, A General View of a Complete Code of 
Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 22, 22 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
106 Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 45, 67 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
107 As Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in a fairly recent case: “[A]t least 100 federal 
false statement statutes may be found in the United States Code.  About 42 of them contain 
an express materiality requirement; approximately 54 do not.  The kinds of false statements 
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B. JUDICIAL CRIME CREATION 
Another major problem with federal criminal law is that it allows 
courts essentially to create new crimes.  The root of the problem here is that 
the courts are notoriously inconsistent in their adherence to the venerable 
rule of lenity.  The rule of lenity—one of the few Marshall Court doctrines 
that has not achieved canonical status
108
—requires courts to construe 
ambiguous criminal laws narrowly, in favor of the defendant.
109
  It does so 
not to show lenience to lawbreakers, but to protect important societal 
interests against the many adverse consequences that judicial expansion of 
crimes can produce—consequences such as the usurpation of the legislative 
crime-definition function, not to mention potential frustration of legislative 
purpose and unfair surprise to persons convicted under unclear statutes.
110
  
The rule of lenity therefore reflects, as Judge Henry Friendly once put it, a 
democratic society’s “instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison 
unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should.”
111
 
More to the point here, faithful adherence to the rule of lenity would 
require courts to counteract overcriminalization.  The rule of lenity requires 
courts to narrow, rather than broaden, the scope of ambiguous criminal 
laws.  This would prevent prosecutors from exploiting the ambiguities of 
poorly defined federal crimes to criminalize conduct Congress has not 
specifically declared a crime.  The rule of lenity would thus make poor 
crime definition an obstacle to—not an occasion or excuse for—more 
expansive applications of federal criminal law. 
Unfortunately, the federal courts treat the rule of lenity with suspicion 
and, at times, outright hostility.  Although it sometimes faithfully applies 
the rule of lenity, the Court has on many other occasions either ignored 
lenity or dismissed it as a principle that applies only when legislative 
 
found in the first category are, to my eyes at least, indistinguishable from those in the second 
category.  Nor is there any obvious distinction between the range of punishments authorized 
by the two different groups of statutes.”  United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505–06 
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
108 See Wiltberger v. United States, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820).  Several prominent 
scholars have forcefully argued in recent years that the rule should be abolished.  See 
Jeffries, supra note 102; Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 
SUP. CT. REV. 345. 
109 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971). 
110 The Court has long recognized that the rule of lenity promotes fair warning and the 
separation of powers in matters of crime definition.  See, e.g., id. 
111 Id. (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, 
reprinted in HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)).  The rule also has an 
important, albeit underappreciated, role in preventing courts from overriding legislative 
grading decisions by increasing the penalties for criminal acts.  See generally Smith, supra 
note 8, at 934–44. 
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history and other interpretive principles cannot give meaning to an 
ambiguous statute.
112
  Indeed, the federal courts so frequently disregard the 
rule of lenity that it is questionable whether it is even accurate today to 
describe it as a “rule”: 
[T]he courts’ aversion to letting blameworthy conduct slip through the federal cracks 
has dramatically reversed the lenity presumption.  The operative presumption in 
criminal cases today is that whenever the conduct in question is morally blameworthy, 
statutes should be broadly construed, in favor of the prosecution, unless the 
defendant’s interpretation is compelled by the statute . . . .  The rule of lenity, in short, 
has been converted from a rule about the proper locus of lawmaking power in the area 
of crime into what can only be described as a “rule of severity.”
113
 
The result of the judiciary’s haphazard adherence to the rule of lenity 
is as predictable as its results have been misguided.  As previously 
explained, federal judges have repeatedly used ambiguous statutes as a 
basis for creating new federal crimes and have expanded the reach of 
overlapping federal crimes to drive up the punishment Congress prescribed 
for less serious federal crimes.
114
  The end result of such assaults on the rule 
of lenity is necessarily a broader and more punitive federal criminal law. 
C. INADEQUATE MENS REA REQUIREMENTS 
Another area of serious concern in federal criminal law is that statutory 
crimes often have inadequate mens rea requirements.  In writing new 
crimes, Congress takes pains to identify the actus reus elements that 
describe the act to be prohibited, but all too often specifies no mens rea 
requirements or inadequate mens rea requirements.  This is troubling 
because mens rea requirements are an essential safeguard against unjust 
convictions and disproportionate punishment. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Morissette v. United States, the 
concept of punishment based on acts alone, without a culpable state of 
 
112 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998), exemplifies the dismissive 
treatment lenity usually receives in federal court.  Faced with a statutory term that even the 
majority admitted had literally dozens of different dictionary meanings and no evidence of 
the meaning Congress intended, the majority simply chose the one it preferred, and in doing 
so brought the defendant under a strict, and otherwise inapplicable, mandatory minimum.  
Id.  Where Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg correctly saw an easy case for the rule of lenity, the 
majority dismissed the rule as irrelevant.  Justice Stephen Breyer wrote: “The rule of lenity 
applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, . . . we can make no 
more than a guess as to what Congress intended.  To invoke the rule, we must conclude that 
there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.”  Id. at 138–39 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s schizophrenic 
case law on lenity, see Kahan, supra note 108, at 384–89. 
113 Smith, supra note 8, at 926. 
114 See supra Part II. 
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mind, is “inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.”
115
  In our 
system, crime is understood as a “compound concept,” requiring both an 
“evil-doing hand” and an “evil-meaning mind.”
116
  The historic role of the 
mens rea requirement is to exempt from punishment those who are not 
“blameworthy in mind” and thereby to limit punishment to persons who 
disregarded notice that their conduct was wrong.
117
  Mens rea also serves to 
achieve proportionality of punishment for blameworthy acts—to make sure 
the law imposes a punishment that “fits” the defendant’s crime.  It is mens 
rea, for example, that guarantees that the harsher penalties for intentional 
homicides will not be applied to accidental homicides.
118
 
Importantly, the linkage between punishment and blameworthiness is 
no artifact from a bygone retributivist age.  Although utilitarians reject the 
retributivist view that moral blameworthiness is the justification for 
punishment, most utilitarians agree that moral blameworthiness is an 
“important limiting principle” for criminal punishment.
119
  The fundamental 
insight here is that there is considerable “utility” in moral “desert”—that a 
criminal law which distributes punishment according to blameworthiness 
will more effectively achieve its crime-prevention goals than one that 




115 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). 
116 Id. at 251.  Notice that, Morissette’s colorful reference to the “evil-doing hand” 
notwithstanding, the actus reus often is innocuous conduct.  For example, the actus reus of 
mail fraud is simply using the mails, see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), and the actus reus of 
Travel Act violations is interstate or international travel, see 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2006).  
The blameworthiness of such crimes comes entirely from mens rea—in the examples just 
given, the illicit purpose for which the mails or channels of commerce are used.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 1341 (intent to defraud); § 1952(a) (intent to commit crimes). 
117 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.  
118 See Smith, supra note 20, at 133–35.  As a consequence: 
[The role of mens rea] is broader than exempting morally blameless conduct from punishment.  
It involves limiting guilt and punishment in accordance with the blameworthiness of the 
defendant’s act.  The means of doing so differs.  In some cases, mens rea serves to carve morally 
innocent conduct out of the reach of a criminal statute whereas, in others, it ensures that morally 
blameworthy conduct will not be punished out of proportion with its level of blameworthiness; in 
still others, it does both.  The goal, however, is the same: to ensure that guilt and punishment 
track the moral blameworthiness of the conduct that gives rise to liability. 
Id. at 136. 
119 PACKER, supra note 6, at 66–67.  Packer was not alone in this regard.  As no less an 
authority than Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. declared: “a law which punished conduct which 
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for 
that community to bear.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 50 (1881). 
120 See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. 
L. REV. 453 (1997) (finding that deviations from moral desert can undercut the criminal 
law’s moral credibility and hence its power to gain compliance by its moral authority). 
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Despite the critical importance of mens rea to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of federal criminal law, federal crimes often lack sufficient mens 
rea elements.  Many federal crimes—including very serious crimes—
contain no express mens rea requirements.
121
  Perhaps more commonly, 
federal crimes include express mens rea requirements for part of the crime 
but are silent as to the mens rea (if any) required for others.
122
  Here, it is 
evident that Congress intended to require mens rea, but it is unclear whether 
Congress intended the express mens rea requirement to exclude additional 
mens rea requirements. 
In many cases, even when Congress includes mens rea terms in the 
definition of crimes, it uses terms such as “willfully” and “maliciously,” 
which have no intrinsic meaning and whose meanings may vary widely in 
different statutory contexts.  Take, for example, “willfulness.”  
“Willfulness” has a chameleon-like quality in federal criminal law: “The 
word ‘willfully’ is sometimes said to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose 
construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears.  Most 
obviously it differentiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in 




The lack of consistent meanings attributed to express mens rea terms 
across statutes is inevitable given the large universe of mens rea terms used 
 
121 To give but two examples, the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (2006), 
construed in United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971), makes it a serious felony to 
possess unregistered grenades and other “firearms,” but contains no express mens rea 
requirements.  Similarly, the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006), makes it a crime to 
commit extortion, defined as obtaining money or property from another, with his consent, 
through the wrongful use of coercion, § 1951(b)(2).  No mens rea requirements appear in the 
definition of the crime. 
122 The false statement statute, for example, requires that the false statement has been 
made “knowingly and willfully” but provides no mens rea requirement for the part of the 
crime requiring that the false statement has been made in a matter within the jurisdiction of a 
federal agency.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  Similarly, the federal child-pornography law requires 
that the defendant “knowingly” transported or received a visual depiction, but prescribes no 
mens rea either for the sexually explicit nature of the visual depiction or the fact that it 
involved minors.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). 
123 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998) (citations omitted).  Even when the 
“bad purpose” definition of “willfulness” is adopted, there still may be no consistency of 
usage.  In Bryan, the Court ruled that, in the context of a willful violation of federal firearms 
requirements, “willfulness” merely required proof that the defendant understood, in a general 
way, that his conduct was illegal.  Id.  In Ratlzaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), 
however, the Court adopted an even more stringent understanding of “willfulness.”  In order 
to commit a willful violation of the prohibition against “structuring” a cash transaction in 
excess of $10,000 into smaller transactions in order to evade currency transaction reporting 
requirements, the Court ruled, the defendant has to know specifically that “structuring” is 
illegal.  Id. at 149. 
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in federal criminal law.  According to the Brown Commission, known more 
formally as the National Commission for Reform of Federal Criminal Law, 
federal criminal statutes contain a “staggering array” of mens rea terms.
124
  
After noting almost eighty different mens rea requirements contained in 
federal crimes, the Commission explained: 
Understandably, the courts have been unable to find substantive correlates for all of 
these varied descriptions of mental states and, in fact, the opinions display far fewer 
mental states than the statutory language.  Not only does the statutory language not 
reflect accurately or consistently what are the mental elements of the various crimes; 
there is no discernible pattern or consistent rationale which explains why one crime is 
defined or understood to require one mental state and another crime another mental 
state or indeed no mental state at all.
125
 
In situations where the crimes enacted by Congress contain 
incomprehensible or incompletely defined mens rea requirements, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to know which elements will require mens rea 
and the precise level of mens rea that will be required.  Unlike the drafters 
of the Model Penal Code, for example, Congress has enacted no default 
level of mental culpability that applies when statutes are silent as to mens 
rea.
126
  Again in contrast to the Model Penal Code, there are no federal 
statutes that provide uniform definitions for mens rea terms
127
 or supply 
interpretive rules specifying which elements require mens rea and, for the 
ones that do, how to determine the precise level of mental culpability that is 
required.
128
  In all these respects, it is up to the federal courts to decide, on 
an ad hoc basis, what (if any) additional mens rea requirements to impose, 
and how to construe “willfulness” and other vague mens rea terms. 
This confusing state of affairs might be acceptable if the courts 
provided the clear interpretive tools or methods that Congress has failed to 
enact.  Unfortunately, however, the courts have been inconsistent in their 
approach to mens rea selection.  Increasingly of late, the Supreme Court 
stands ready to read mens rea requirements into statutes that are wholly or 
partly silent as to mens rea, and the reason is that the Court has placed 
 
124 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 
119 (1970). 
125 Id. at 119–20. 
126 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (prescribing “recklessness” as the default MPC 
level of mental culpability). 
127 See § 2.02(2)(a)–(d) (defining “purpose,” “knowledge,” “recklessness,” and 
“negligence”). 
128 See § 2.02(1) (mandating that all “material elements” of MPC offenses require mens 
rea); § 2.02(4) (supplying interpretive rule to determine mens rea for all elements where 
mens rea is prescribed for part but not all of an MPC offense). 
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renewed emphasis on making a morally culpable state of mind a 
prerequisite to punishment.
129
  This, however, is not invariably so. 
Sometimes, courts treat legislative silence concerning mens rea as a 
legislative signal to dispense with mens rea requirements.  This is especially 
the case with regulatory crimes protecting the public health, safety, and 
welfare.  Even Morissette v. United States, with its strong emphasis on the 
traditional requirement that a culpable mental state is a prerequisite to 
punishment, conceded that the requirement may not apply to regulatory or 
other crimes not derived from the common law.
130
  The Court seized on this 
statement in United States v. Freed as justification for treating a felony 




To be sure, more recent cases cast doubt on Morissette and Freed in 
this respect.  Among these cases are Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 
States,
132
 Ratzlaf v. United States,
133
 and Staples v. United States.
134
  In each 
case, the Supreme Court adopted heightened mens rea requirements, and 
two of these cases (Arthur Andersen and Ratzlaf) went so far as to make 
ignorance of the law a defense.
135
  Each time, the Court ratcheted up mens 
 
129 A good example is Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994).  In that case, the 
defendant was convicted for possession of an unregistered machine gun despite his claimed 
ignorance of his rifle’s ability to fire automatically.  Id. at 602–04.  To the prosecution, all 
that mattered was that he knew his rifle was a gun.  Id. at 606, 608–14.  The Court disagreed.  
Id. at 619.  In our gun-friendly culture, where ordinary firearms are lawful possessions in 
millions of households, mere knowledge that one is in possession of a gun fails to give 
notice of a potential violation.  In order for the requisite culpable mental state to exist, the 
government must prove the defendant knew the characteristic of his gun (its automatic-firing 
capability) that placed it in the category of “quasi-suspect” weapons as to which citizens 
expect legal regulation.  Id. at 602. 
130 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258–60 (1952).  As unfortunate as 
Morissette’s dicta was in this respect, the Court had previously held that the category of 
regulatory offenses that Morissette later referred to as “public welfare offenses” “dispenses 
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.”  
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (emphasis added). 
131 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971) (noting that common law crimes belong to a “different 
category” than the “expanding regulatory area involving activities affecting public health, 
safety, and welfare” as to which relaxed mens rea requirements apply). 
132 544 U.S. 696 (2000). 
133 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
134 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
135 Ratzlaf held that, to be guilty of willfully violating the “structuring” ban, defendants 
must have known that “structuring” was illegal.  See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136–37.  Arthur 
Andersen held that ordering the destruction of documents to keep them out of the hands of 
federal investigators cannot be considered “knowing corruption,” within the meaning of 18 
U.S.C. § 1512(b), unless the person who gave the order knew he was acting illegally.  See 
Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 706. 
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rea requirements for the stated purpose of preventing conviction for morally 
blameless conduct. 
These cases, I believe, are best read as making a culpable mental state 
a prerequisite for punishment for all crimes, even regulatory offenses.  As I 
have noted elsewhere: 
[T]he Supreme Court has dramatically revitalized the mens rea requirement for 
federal crimes.  The “guilty mind” requirement now aspires to exempt all “innocent” 
(or morally blameless) conduct from punishment and restrict criminal statutes to 
conduct that is “inevitably nefarious.”  When a literal interpretation of a federal 
criminal statute could encompass “innocent” behavior, courts stand ready to impose 
heightened mens rea requirements designed to exempt all such behavior from 
punishment.  The goal of current federal mens rea doctrine, in other words, is nothing 




The fact remains, however, that Freed and cases like it have never been 
overturned.  Unless that happens, confusion will persist—and, with it, the 
possibility that moral blameworthiness may be not be required for some 





136 Smith, supra note 20, at 127 (footnotes omitted).  See generally John S. Wiley, Jr., 
Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999). 
137 Professor Jeffrey Meyer argues that this possibility has already materialized.  On the 
goal of limiting punishment to blameworthy acts, he writes: 
These ideals are no more than myth for most federal criminal cases today.  For a wide range of 
the most commonly charged federal crimes, judges routinely instruct juries to convict defendants 
regardless of their moral culpability—that is, even if there is no proof or finding that the 
defendant knew she was doing something wrong. 
Jeffrey A. Meyer, Authentically Innocent: Juries and Federal Regulatory Crimes, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 137, 137 (2007).  Although I agree with Meyer’s descriptive claim, I do not 
share his belief that federal mens rea doctrine is necessarily doomed to fail as long as it relies 
on judicial decisionmaking to exclude blameless conduct from punishment.  As I argue 
elsewhere, the reason that blameless conduct can result in conviction, in spite of a doctrine 
of mens rea specifically designed to prevent that from happening, is that the doctrine is 
restricted in ways that prevent courts from responding in all cases with heightened mens rea 
requirements (including knowledge of illegality) that are essential to exempting blameless 
acts from punishment.  See Stephen F. Smith, “Innocence” and the Guilty Mind, at 50–74 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  For example, even if knowledge of 
illegality is required to exempt blameless conduct from punishment, the Supreme Court will 
not make ignorance of the law a defense absent a textual indication from Congress, such as 
use of the term “willfully” or other language importing “a legal element in the definition of 
the offense,” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 n.9 (1985), of legislative intent to 
require knowledge of the law.  See generally Smith, supra at 51–61.  Removing these 
counterproductive restrictions may well allow mens rea doctrine to achieve its important 
purposes without, as Meyer seems to propose, making jury trials freewheeling inquiries into 
moral blameworthiness. 
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One thing, however, is certain: as long as courts fail to make proof of a 
culpable mental state an unyielding prerequisite to punishment, federal 
prosecutors will continue to water down mens rea requirements in ways that 
allow conviction without blameworthiness.  That is exactly what 
prosecutors did, for example, in Arthur Andersen during the wave of post-
Enron hysteria over corporate fraud.  In seeking to convict Enron’s 
accounting firm of the “corrupt persuasion” form of obstruction of justice, 
prosecutors—flatly disregarding the lesson of cases like Staples and 
Ratzlaf—argued for incredibly weak mens rea requirements that, as the 




Although the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Justice 
Department’s efforts and overturned Arthur Andersen’s conviction,
139
 the 
firm had less cause to celebrate than one might think.  After being convicted 
on a prosecution theory so aggressive that it could not win even a single 
vote from the Justices, the company—once a “Big Five” accounting firm—
went out of the consulting business.
140
  Even now that it no longer stands 
convicted of a crime, its reputation has in all likelihood been damaged 
beyond repair.  Its own conduct in the Enron matter had a lot to do with 
that, of course, but so did the overzealousness of federal prosecutors in 
exploiting the serious imperfections in federal mens rea doctrine.  The 
Arthur Andersen episode simultaneously shows the need for substantial 
mens rea reform and the high cost of not having strong mens rea 
requirements in federal criminal law. 
D. DISPROPORTIONATELY SEVERE PENALTIES 
Of the wide array of critiques that have been leveled against federal 
criminal law in recent decades, one of the most consistent is that it 
frequently produces disproportionately severe sentences.  Especially in the 
frequently prosecuted area of drug and firearms offenses (which account for 
roughly 40% of all federal prosecutions),
141
 federal mandatory minimum 
 
138 The government’s interpretation would have made it a crime either to withhold 
documents from federal investigators or to destroy documents pursuant to the sort of 
document-retention policies that are commonplace in the business world, even if the person 
responsible for nondisclosure or destruction of the documents honestly believed he was 
acting lawfully—and even if the person did not know, or have reason to know, that the 
documents pertained to a federal investigation.  See Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705–08. 
139 Id. at 697–98. 
140 See Agnes T. Crane, Longing for Days of the Big Eight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, at 
B2 (discussing the implications of the demise of Arthur Andersen’s consulting business). 
141 According to 2011–2012 data, 39% of federal criminal defendants were charged with 
drug or weapons offenses.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 17–18 (2012).  
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sentences sometime equal or exceed the maximum punishment that would 
be available in state court for parallel offenses.
142
  As a result of tough 
federal mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines that are 
considerably harsher than those followed in many states, “similarly situated 




Even defenders of tough, guidelines-based sentencing have criticized 
the proliferation of mandatory minimums throughout federal law.  As 
former U.S. District Judge Paul G. Cassell has noted, “many of the[] ‘horror 
stories’ [in federal sentencing] stem from mandatory minimums in general 
and the narcotics mandatory minimums in particular.”
144
  Consistent with 
this view, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended long ago that 
statutory mandatory minimums be repealed in favor of its more context-
specific, guidelines-based approach to sentencing.
145
 
Despite these sensible recommendations, the number of provisions for 
mandatory minimum sentences, like the number of federal crimes, has 
increased considerably.  Consider the following: 
There are approximately one hundred different provisions in the federal criminal code 
imposing mandatory minimum sentences, and a number of these provisions concern 
the frequently prosecuted areas of drug and weapons offenses.  The impact of these 
provisions is far greater than their number would suggest.  For example, between 
1984 and 1991 alone, “nearly 60,000 cases” were sentenced pursuant to mandatory 
minimums.
146 
The presence of such severe penalties on the federal books is directly 
related to overcriminalization, in two different respects.  Most obviously, 
the extreme penalties that federal law affords are a product of 
overcriminalization.  Higher penalties, like new crimes, are a cheap but 
 
Moreover, suspects charged with drug or weapons offenses “had the highest prosecution 
rates in 2009” (77% and 69%, respectively, as compared to a 58% rate of prosecution for 
crimes of violence).  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 7 
(Dec. 2011). 
142 See generally Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal 
Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (1997). 
143 Beale, supra note 22, at 982.  As an example, Professor Beale cites federal drug 
offenses, which result in sentences that are often “ten or even twenty times higher” than the 
sentences that would be imposed in state court for the same conduct.  Id. at 998–99. 
144 Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a 
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1045 (2004). 
145 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991).  In this regard, the Sentencing Commission 
followed the lead of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which passed a resolution 
in March 1990 urging Congress to “reconsider the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentence 
statutes.”  Id. at G-1. 
146 Smith, supra note 8, at 895 (footnotes omitted). 
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politically effective means through which legislators can signal to their 
constituencies that they are “tough” on crime.  Increased penalties also 
serve the interest of prosecutors by making it easier to extract guilty pleas 
from defendants.
 
Furthermore, the severity of federal penalties serves to exacerbate, in a 
fairly dramatic way, the problem of overcriminalization.  The point is that 
federal prosecutors are much more likely to bring prosecutions for the kinds 
of crimes that carry unusually high penalties compared to those available 
under state law.  The ability of high penalties to skew federal enforcement 
policies may explain why drug offenses are among the most commonly 
prosecuted federal crimes and why crimes regularly prosecuted in state 
court account for the bulk of the federal prosecutions annually. 
To see the kind of mischief that unusually high federal penalties can 
cause, consider United States v. Armstrong.
147
  By virtue of the infamous 
100-to-1 crack/powder cocaine disparity,
148
 federal sentences for offenders 
convicted of dealing crack cocaine far exceeded the penalties they would 
have faced had they not been targeted for federal prosecution.  The high 
penalties under federal law resulted in more federal crack prosecutions—
and enormous racial disparities in which 86% of federal defendants 
convicted for dealing crack were black (only 4% were white) and blacks 
“on average received sentences over 40% longer than whites.”
149
 
E. INADEQUATE DEFENSES 
Although not often recognized as such, defenses are an important 
element in the overcriminalization debate.  The problem is not just that 
there are too many crimes and crimes are poorly defined.  The deeper 
problem is that overcriminalization tends to treat the criminal law as a one-
way ratchet: while crimes are continuously enacted and cast in very broad, 
capacious language (language that prosecutors and courts make even 
broader through expansive interpretations), the defenses to criminal 
liability are few in number and framed incredibly narrowly. 
 
147 517 U.S. 456 (1996). 
148 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96–98 (2007). 
149 Id. at 479–80 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In a historic move, Congress recently 
addressed this unjust situation, albeit in a manner that operates prospectively only.  Under 
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which passed with bipartisan support, Congress rejected the 
100-to-1 rule in favor of a more defensible (but still arbitrary) 18-to-1 rule.  See Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat. 2372 (amending 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841, 844, 960).  Congress also acted to ameliorate the harsh statutory mandatory 
minimums for crack offenses, raising the drug quantity necessary to trigger the mandatory 
minimums for crack and even going so far as to repeal outright the mandatory minimum for 
simple possession of crack.  See id. 
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This is unfortunate because defenses have a vital role to play in 
keeping criminal liability within appropriate bounds.  This is easy to see 
with “justification” defenses, such as self-defense and necessity.  Such 
defenses exist to exempt from criminal liability otherwise illegal conduct 
that is morally justified in the circumstances.
150
  Using force to repel a 
rapist or breaking into a house as a necessary means of rescuing an 
occupant from a deadly fire, for example, are exempt from punishment even 
though, in other circumstances, the law punishes using force against others 
or breaking into houses. 
Other defenses, called “excuses,” differ from justification defenses in 
that excuses concern blameworthy conduct.  Nonetheless, like justification 
defenses, excuses serve to prevent conviction in exceptional circumstances 
where punishment would be unfair.
151
  Where, for example, a person 
committed a crime due to insanity or duress, the law withholds 
punishment—not because the crimes were morally appropriate or justified, 
but rather because, in such extreme circumstances, the lawbreaker cannot 
fairly be blamed for his crimes. 
In the federal system, some crimes include statutory defenses specific 
to those crimes.  The crime of perjury, for example, carries a recantation 
defense: if a witness voluntarily admits the falsity of a perjured statement in 
a timely manner, “such admission shall bar prosecution under this 
section.”
152
  Such crime-specific defenses are rare, comparatively speaking.  
Most federal crimes contain no such defenses.  In those situations, the only 
defenses available to defendants will be the classic common law defenses, 
such as insanity, necessity, duress, and entrapment—defenses that, with the 
exception of the insanity defense, are not recognized by statute.
153
 
The federal courts have exacerbated the one-way ratchet nature of 
overcriminalization.  The same courts that so often create crimes (by 
disregarding the rule of lenity and expansively interpreting ambiguous 
criminal laws) refuse to create defenses to crimes. 
 
150 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 13 (1968). 
151 See, e.g., id. at 13–14. 
152 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2006). 
153 The insanity defense is recognized by statute, but only because Congress sought to 
limit the defense in the wake of John Hinckley’s acquittal on insanity grounds for the 
attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.  See 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).  Prior to 
that point, the insanity defense, like other common law defenses, existed in the federal 
system through decisional law only. 
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In Brogan v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court refused to 
recognize an “exculpatory no” defense to false statement charges.
154
  The 
majority declared, flatly, that “[c]ourts may not create their own limitations 
on [criminal] legislation, no matter how alluring the policy arguments for 
doing so,” the obvious implication being that it is for Congress alone to 
determine whether criminal conduct should be exempted from 
punishment.
155
  Ironically, although courts will create crimes under the 
guise of statutory interpretation, they will not create defenses. 
Worse still, a recent Supreme Court decision has called into serious 
question the very existence of the classic common law defenses.  In United 
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,
156
 a case involving 
whether medical necessity is a defense to federal drug charges, the majority 
opinion contained sweeping dicta suggesting that necessity and other 
nonstatutory defenses may be inappropriate in federal prosecutions.  Absent 
codification by statute, the Court viewed the necessity defense (and, by 
extension, other common law defenses) not only as “controversial” but 
“especially so” because “federal crimes are defined by statute rather than by 
common law.”
157
  The disturbing implication is that there may be no 
defenses at all in federal cases except those few specifically created by 
Congress. 
IV. HOW COURTS CAN HELP OVERCOME (INSTEAD OF EXACERBATE) 
OVERCRIMINALIZATION 
To the extent overcriminalization is as harmful as I have portrayed it, 
the next question is what, if anything, can be done about it.  It is at this 
point that standard critiques of overcriminalization run into a brick wall.  
The usual assumption is that the only meaningful cure for the disease that is 
overcriminalization is legislative (Congress must repeal, and refrain from 
enacting, unnecessary criminal laws) or constitutional (the federal courts 
should use the Constitution to reduce the scope of criminal liability).
158
  
This assumption is as understandable as it is self-defeating.  If 
overcriminalization is understood in quantitative terms, then any cure must 
involve sharply reducing both the number and scope of criminal laws, yet it 
 
154 522 U.S. 398 (1998).  The “exculpatory no” doctrine would have exempted from 
punishment under the false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006), statements that 
consist only of a false denial of guilt. 
155 Id. at 408. 
156 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
157 Id. at 490.  Ultimately, the Court did not rest on this broad ground but instead on the 
narrow ground that the Controlled Substances Act impliedly precluded necessity arguments 
for medicinal uses of marijuana and other “Schedule I” drugs.  See id. at 492, 494–95. 
158 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 22. 
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is exceedingly unlikely that Congress would be restrained in its use of the 
criminal sanction or that courts would be so activist as to declare 
unconstitutional large portions of federal criminal law.
159
 
Once it is understood that overcriminalization also has qualitative 
elements—elements for which courts themselves bear a large share of the 
blame—it becomes apparent that there is a ready solution to 
overcriminalization short of heroic legislative self-restraint or judicial 
activism in curbing the power to punish crimes.  This solution is for courts 
to interpret statutes in ways that counteract overcriminalization and the 
qualitative defects that overcriminalization produces.  New interpretive 
strategies, tailored to the troubling realities of a criminal justice system 
characterized by overcriminalization and to the important normative goals 
of the system (such as limiting punishment in accordance with moral 
blameworthiness), can help right what is so fundamentally wrong with 
federal criminal law. 
A. RESTORE THE RULE OF LENITY TO ITS RIGHTFUL PLACE 
Given how often courts interpret criminal statutes expansively, it 
should be clear that courts do not simply let the weights on the interpretive 
scales determine whether statutes are to be read broadly or narrowly, as 
critics of the rule of lenity would have them do.  Instead, the balance is 
heavily skewed in favor of the prosecution when the conduct in question is 
morally blameworthy, even when the consequence of a broad interpretation 
is to allow prosecutors to drive up considerably the punishment that would 
otherwise apply or to evade limitations the legislature included in the 
definition of the crime in more specific statutes.  Whether the law 




 or just 
 
159 See supra note 9. 
160 E.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).  See generally Smith, supra note 
8, at 911–13 (discussing the implications of Turkette for efforts to eradicate organized 
crime). 
161 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), is a case in point.  There, the defendant 
sought to trade a machine gun for drugs.  He was convicted of multiple drug offenses, and 
presumably could have been convicted of any number of serious firearms offenses as well.  
Suffice it to say that there was no danger that he or others who purchase drugs with guns 
(much less machine guns) would slip through the federal cracks.  The prosecutor, however, 
argued that exchanging guns for drugs constitutes use of a firearm “during and in relation to 
. . . [a] drug trafficking crime” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006).  One would 
think that such barter is not a terribly significant problem: even if trading guns for drugs is 
common (which is far from self-evident), it would surely be the rare drug dealer whose 
access to firearms depends on bartering customers.  Nevertheless, the Court rejected the 
ordinary meaning of “using a gun” (which connotes employment as a weapon) and endorsed 
the “universal view of the courts of appeals” that the statute encompasses barter with, as well 
as more lethal “uses” of, guns.  Smith, 508 U.S. at 233.  That the Court stretched the statute 
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silly,
162
 the one constant seems to be that courts will go to almost any length 
to keep blameworthy conduct from slipping through the federal cracks.  
Thus, it is closer to the truth to say that the operative interpretive rule in 
federal criminal cases is severity: that ambiguous statutes presumptively 
should be broadly construed to prevent culpable defendants from slipping 
through the federal cracks. 
In practice, then, rejecting the rule of lenity tends to look a lot like 
endorsing anti-lenity (or a rule of severity).  That, in turn, affords a 
substantial justification for taking lenity seriously even if, as a theoretical 
matter, an evenhanded approach to the interpretation of criminal statutes 
might be preferable to a strict-construction default.  After all, even critics of 
lenity do not contend that criminal laws should always be interpreted 
broadly.  Professor Kahan, for example, asserts that “federal criminal 
statutes should not uniformly be read either narrowly or broadly, but rather 
appropriately so as to carry out their purposes and to realize the full range 
of benefits associated with delegated lawmaking.”
163
  The obvious 
assumption is that there is a viable interpretive middle ground between the 
lenity side of the spectrum (at which ambiguous statutes are always 
narrowly construed) and the anti-lenity or severity side of the spectrum (in 
which such statutes are always broadly construed), an assumption that is 
difficult to reconcile with the courts’ track record in interpreting federal 
crimes.  Given that courts often miss valid reasons for narrowly construing 
statutes,
164
 a consistently applied rule of lenity, under which every 
ambiguous criminal statute is read narrowly, is the right interpretive rule. 
The political economy of criminal law confirms that lenity is the right 
interpretive default.  The relevant question is which interpretive rule gives 
legislatures proper incentives to make their intentions clear concerning the 
scope and meaning of criminal statutes.  To the extent legislatures generally 
 
to convict is all the more remarkable given the draconian penal consequences of its 
interpretation: for having bartered with a machine gun, Smith faced a mandatory minimum 
sentence of thirty years, to run consecutively with the sentence for his underlying drug 
convictions.  Id. at 227; see § 924(c)(1)(A) (requiring that the mandatory minimum be 
imposed “in addition to the punishment provided for [the underlying] crime”). 
162 In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), the Court watered down the mens rea 
required to convict under the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, to “permit[] the 
statute to reach cases . . . where an ex-convict robs a bank [without any intent to abscond 
with the loot] because he wants to be apprehended and returned to prison.”  Carter, 530 U.S. 
at 271.  The reader will be forgiven for regarding this as a solution in desperate search of a 
problem. 
163 Kahan, supra note 108, at 426; see also Jeffries, supra note 102, at 220–21 
(identifying situations in which criminal laws should be interpreted narrowly). 
164 See generally Smith, supra note 8, at 893–930. 
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share prosecutors’ desire for broad criminal prohibitions,
165
 a rigidly 
enforced rule of lenity would operate as an information-forcing default rule, 
giving legislatures added incentive to make their wishes known ex ante.  
Additionally, once an ambiguity arises, the question is whether prosecutors 
or defendants are in the best position to get the legislature to resolve the 
interpretive question.  There is no doubt that prosecutors are best suited to 
the task of overcoming legislative inertia.  As Professor Einer Elhauge 
explains, “there is no effective lobby for narrowing criminal statutes” 
whereas “an overly narrow interpretation is far more likely to be 
corrected . . . because prosecutors and other members of anti-criminal 
lobbying groups are heavily involved in legislative drafting and can more 
readily get on the legislative agenda.”
166
 
One might wonder what the point of enforcing the rule of lenity would 
be if legislatures can be counted upon to repeal decisions narrowing the 
reach of criminal statutes.  The fact, however, is that legislatures do not 
reflexively ride to the rescue of prosecutors handed interpretive defeats in 
court.  According to a leading study of congressional overrides of Supreme 
Court decisions, Congress is more likely to overturn decisions narrowing 
criminal laws than those giving laws expansive interpretations, but 
nevertheless lets stand the vast majority (80%) of narrow interpretations.
167
  
This is cause for optimism about the potential for lenity to avoid 
disproportionate penalties and make serious inroads on overcriminalization. 
B. PROPORTIONALITY-BASED APPROACHES TO STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 
If, despite the obvious advantages of the rule of lenity, the courts are to 
remain fickle in their adherence to it, they should at least pay close attention 
to the potential sentencing consequences before expanding the reach of a 
criminal statute.  This inquiry will require courts to look past the facts of the 
cases before them and hypothesize the range of potential applications of the 
statute,
168
 paying close attention to the penal consequences of an expansive 
interpretation.  In cases where an expansive interpretation would threaten to 
 
165 See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 510, 534–35 (describing legislatures and prosecutors as 
“natural allies”). 
166 Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
2162, 2194 (2002). 
167 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 351 tbl.9 & 352 (1991). 
168 This hypothetical inquiry is exactly how the Supreme Court decides federal mens rea 
issues.  See Wiley, supra note 136, at 1023 (explaining that courts deciding such issues start 
by asking “as a hypothetical matter whether morally blameless people could violate [the 
statute]”). 
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visit disproportionate punishment on convicted offenders, as determined 
against the baseline of other criminal laws (state or federal) proscribing the 
same criminal act, a narrow reading is the appropriate response unless the 
plain meaning of the statute commands a broader interpretation.
169
 
Proportionality considerations should also be factored into mens rea 
selection.  The Supreme Court should repudiate the notion that avoiding 
conviction of morally blameless conduct is the only goal of mens rea 
doctrine.
170
  A separate, equally vital goal, and a proper concern of mens rea 
doctrine, is to ensure that the sanctions available in the event of conviction 
will be proportional to the blameworthiness of convicted offenders.
171
  
Imposing punishment in excess of blameworthiness is just as offensive in 
principle as punishing for blameless conduct: either way, courts are 
imposing punishment that is not justified by the culpability of the offender 
and gambling with the moral credibility of the criminal law.  Crimes for 
which Congress has prescribed severe penalties should require 
correspondingly high levels of mens rea so that offenders will be seriously 
blameworthy.  Only then will convicted offenders be morally deserving of 
the stiff penalties that federal law affords. 
C. STATUTORY EXCLUSIVITY 
The reforms previously discussed all address the common situation in 
which federal criminal statutes are ambiguous and thus, as a textual matter, 
can reasonably be read either broadly or narrowly.  One additional reform is 
necessary to address the situation in which a number of overlapping statutes 
apply to the same basic crime: making specific criminal statutes addressing 
the same crime exclusive of more general statutes.  The problem here is not 
that the statutes are ambiguous; it is that there are too many statutes that 
 
169 Pleas for proportionality of punishment inevitably encounter the objection that it is 
impossible to determine when, objectively speaking, punishments are proportional.  Though 
familiar, the objection is misplaced.  Proportionality serves as a judicially manageable legal 
standard in a variety of other contexts, such as determining the excessiveness of terms of 
imprisonment and of punitive-damages awards, and proportionality is used, by legislatures 
and judges alike, in grading offenses and sentencing offenders.  See Smith, supra note 8, at 
891–92 (citing cases).  Taking proportionality considerations into account in interpreting 
federal crimes is no more perilous than in these other contexts, especially if, as suggested 
here, the proportionality inquiry is grounded in a comparison with the penalties other laws 
provide for a particular crime and is used only as an interpretive principle (as opposed to a 
standard of constitutionality). 
170 In Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255 (2000), for example, the Court declared that 
mens rea doctrine “requires a court to read into a statute only that mens rea which is 
necessary to separate wrongful conduct from ‘otherwise innocent conduct.’”  Id. at 269. 
171 For an extensive argument along this line, see Smith, supra note 20. 
2012] OVERCOMING OVERCRIMINALIZATION 583 
plainly apply to same criminal act.  The example given earlier was fraud,
172
 
but the point is easily generalizable: when multiple criminal laws regulate 
the same criminal act but provide different penalties or define the crime 
differently, allowing prosecutors to pick and choose among the statutes at 
will is necessarily to allow them to override legislative policy choices 
concerning crime definition and the proper penalty for a criminal act. 
This problem can and should be solved by adopting a principle of 
statutory exclusivity to address the redundancy of the federal code.  On this 
approach, when multiple statutes of the same type apply to the same act or 
omission,
173
 prosecutors would be required to proceed under the most 
specific statute applicable to that act to the exclusion of more general 
crimes, even if that would mean that the prosecution would fail due to how 
Congress defined the most specific crime.
174
  The reason for limiting 
prosecutors to the most specific statute is that the more specific the crime is, 
the more likely it is that Congress understood the range of behaviors that it 
was criminalizing and thus that the definition of the crime and the 
prescribed punishment will fit those behaviors. 
To illustrate how the exclusivity approach would work, consider, for 
example, a prosecution involving the fraudulent use of credit cards.  
Although mail and wire fraud could, as a literal matter, apply, the credit-
card fraud statute would be the more specific statute because it applies to a 
subset of frauds orchestrated through the use of the mails and wires—
namely, frauds involving credit cards.  Consequently, the credit-card fraud 
statute would be the exclusive basis for prosecuting that act.  This would 





172 See supra Part II.A.2. 
173 The requirement that overlapping statutes be of the same type is an important 
limitation because it ensures that the penal comparison will be appropriate.  For example, 
rape is both a battery (in the sense that it involves an unwanted, offensive touching) and a 
sexual assault.  Those crimes, though capable of being committed by the same physical act, 
protect victim interests of differing weight (bodily integrity versus sexual autonomy), and so 
the penalty for battery is not an appropriate measure of what the penalty should be for rape.  
Similarly, in the example of a fatal beating, the fact that the beating is an assault would 
obviously not tell us what the punishment should be when it results in death.  In both sets of 
crimes, the heightened punishment for the more serious crime (i.e., rape and murder, 
respectively) is justified by the greater seriousness of those crimes, and no rational 
legislature would grade those crimes at the level of battery and assault. 
174 The Court has adopted such exclusivity principles in other contexts.  See supra note 
101. 
175 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1644 (2006) (credit-card fraud), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 
(2006) (mail and wire fraud, respectively).  In some cases, however, exclusivity will actually 
require the prosecutor to use the statute carrying the higher punishment.  For example, if a 
defendant mails in a materially false credit application to a federally insured bank, the bank 
584 STEPHEN F. SMITH [Vol. 102 
Notice that if the amount of the fraud was below the monetary 
threshold specified in the credit-card statute, no federal fraud statute could 
be used.  This is because the prosecutor would be limited to the credit-card 
statute yet unable to prove a necessary element for conviction under that 
statute.  In that event, the prosecutor would have two choices: either charge 
the defendant for a different criminal act or omission (assuming there is 
one), or leave the defendant to potential prosecution in state court.  As this 
example demonstrates, an exclusivity approach would prevent federal 
prosecutors from using charge selection to evade congressional policy 
choices about the definition of federal crimes or to drive up the maximum 




To be sure, the exclusivity approach would represent a considerable 
departure from the status quo in federal criminal law.  Even so, it is not 
without precedent; indeed, the principles motivating the exclusivity 
approach have already been endorsed by the Supreme Court under the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA)
177
 for crimes committed on federal 
enclaves.  The exclusivity approach outlined here, therefore, is actually far 
less radical than it might otherwise seem. 
In Lewis v. United States, the Supreme Court sought to prevent 
prosecutors from using the ACA to evade offense grading and other 
 
fraud statute would be the most specific statute as compared to mail or wire fraud.  Bank 
fraud, however, is punishable by up to thirty years in prison versus the twenty-year 
maximum for mail and wire fraud.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (bank fraud), with §§ 1341, 
1343 (mail and wire fraud, respectively). 
176 Cases may arise in which it is unclear which of two potentially applicable crimes of 
the same type is the more specific.  When it is unclear which statute should be the exclusive 
remedy, it makes sense to err on the side of caution and require use of the statute carrying 
the lower penalty.  To be sure, this tiebreaker rule resolves ambiguous cases according to a 
substantive bias (avoiding potentially disproportionate punishment), but that is 
unexceptional.  For instance, the federalism clear-statement rule resolves ambiguities about 
the scope of federal laws against alteration of the federal-state balance, United States v. 
Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), statutes in derogation of the common law are presumptively 
read as retaining entrenched common law principles, United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 
534 (1993), and, where possible, statutes are read to ensure their constitutionality, INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001). 
177 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2006).  The Act, passed at a time when there was little or no federal 
criminal law applicable to federal enclaves, allows prosecutors to fill “gaps” in federal 
enclave law by “borrowing” offenses from the state in which the enclave is located and using 
such offenses as the basis for a federal conviction.  State crimes can be borrowed when the 
defendant committed, on a federal enclave, “any act or omission which, although not made 
punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted 
within the jurisdiction of the State . . . in which such place is situated.”  § 13(a).  The same 
basic approach governs under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006), for crimes 
committed in Indian Country.  Id. § 1153(b). 
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congressional policy determinations embodied in federal crimes.
178
 The 
case involved a fatal child beating classified as second-degree murder under 
federal law because it was not premeditated.
179
  The prosecutor, however, 
used the ACA to borrow a state statute that treated the death of a child 
under the age of twelve as capital murder, even if unpremeditated, if the 
defendant intended to kill or seriously harm the child.
180
  The government 
essentially argued that, as is the case with overlapping federal criminal 
laws, prosecutors can pick and choose among potentially applicable 
criminal statutes as they see fit to take advantage of penal and other 
differences between the crimes. 
The Lewis majority refused to allow the prosecutor to use the ACA 
essentially to rewrite the federal definition of first-degree murder and 
thereby obtain a penalty—death—that Congress had reserved for 
premeditated murders.  It was “fairly obvious,” the majority thought, that 
resort to the ACA is improper “where both state and federal statutes seek to 
punish approximately the same wrongful behavior—where, for example, 
differences among elements of the crimes reflect jurisdictional, or other 
technical, considerations, or where differences amount only to those of 
name, definitional language, or punishment.”
181
  Thus, the prosecutor had to 
use the federal murder statute, even though its definition and grading were 
not advantageous in that case. 
The parallels between Lewis and the exclusivity approach suggested 
above are striking.  In Lewis, the Court was rightly troubled by the fact that 
prosecutors were using the ACA to get around inconvenient limitations that 
Congress wrote into the definition of federal crimes and to obtain higher 
penalties than those Congress authorized for those crimes.  What the Court 
has inexplicably failed to realize, however, is that the same problems 
exist—except on a much larger scale—within the purely federal sphere.  
The strategic charge selection that so troubled the Lewis Court happens 
every day in federal courtrooms: prosecutors routinely exploit the enormous 
breadth and depth of the federal criminal code to get around limitations in 
the definition of particular crimes and to drive up the punishments available 
in any given case.  In both cases, the critical point is that federal 
prosecutors—who are supposed to implement policy choices made by 
Congress—are instead systematically exploiting overlapping offenses to 
override those choices. 
 
178 523 U.S. 155 (1998). 
179 Id. at 158. 
180 Id. at 166–68 (citing statutes). 
181 Id. at 165. 
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D. REINVIGORATE STATE-OF-MIND AND OTHER DEFENSES 
On the subject of defenses, the place to begin is for the Supreme Court 
to overrule United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative.
182
  The 
trouble here is not the result the Court reached (which was sound), but 
rather the majority’s sweeping and highly problematic dicta questioning the 
propriety of federal courts enforcing nonstatutory defenses—even ones as 
entrenched in Anglo-American common law as necessity
183
—to statutory 
crimes.  The common law recognized justification and excuse defenses 
precisely to avoid morally undeserved punishment for acts that would 
otherwise be condemned as a crime.
184
  Were the federal courts to cease 
enforcing these defenses, the result would necessarily be to expose morally 
blameless conduct—conduct that presently is overwhelmingly, if not 
universally, exempt from punishment in our country
185
—to punishment in 
the federal system. 
Oakland Cannabis’s suggestion that such a radical departure from 
existing practice may be necessary to show proper respect for legislative 
supremacy in crime definition
186
 is misplaced.  It is a commonplace of 
statutory interpretation that Congress legislates against the background of 
the common law and is presumed not only to be aware of, but also to accept 
continued adherence to, common law rules and principles not abrogated by 
statute.
187
  At a minimum, this doctrine easily encompasses continued 
enforcement of common law defenses to subsequently enacted criminal 
laws.  In passing the thousands of crimes presently on the federal books, 
Congress presumptively knew that common law defenses exist in the 
federal system and, by not repudiating those defenses (and, in the case of 
 
182 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a valid defense to the 
manufacture, possession, or distribution of controlled substances). 
183 See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).  Necessity also 
includes a variety of established justification defenses, such as self-defense and law 
enforcement’s privilege to use force in effecting arrests or to commit crimes (such as 
undercover “sting” operations) to catch lawbreakers in the act.  None of these justification 
defenses exist by virtue of federal statute, and thus all are at risk under Oakland Cannabis. 
184 In the case of justification defenses, such as necessity and self-defense, the 
defendant’s conduct is morally appropriate and thus exempted from punishment.  By 
contrast, excuses (such as insanity, immaturity, and duress) deal with situations where 
punishment is withheld, not because the defendant’s conduct was morally blameless, but 
rather because exceptional circumstances (such as severe mental disease, extreme youth, or 
overwhelming external pressure, respectively) make it unfair to punish the defendant despite 
the blameworthiness of his act. 
185 With the exception of the insanity defense, which has been abolished in four states, 
the classic justification and excuse defenses remain available in every state. 
186 See Oakland Cannabis, 532 U.S. at 490. 
187 See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289–90 & n.13 (2010). 
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the insanity defense, by expressly codifying it
188
) indicated its expectation 




Although not commonly recognized, Oakland Cannabis calls into 
serious question the source of the authority of the federal courts to impose 
implied (read: “judicially created”) mens rea requirements.  If, as Oakland 
Cannabis suggests, longstanding congressional acquiescence in defenses as 
deeply rooted in the common law as necessity does not justify continued 
judicial enforcement of those defenses, then the common law heritage 
concerning implied mens rea requirements, recognized as long ago as 
Morissette v. United States,
190
 cannot guarantee the propriety of judicially 
created mens rea requirements.  After all, the purpose and effect of reading 
mens rea requirements into criminal statutes is to create, on judicial 
initiative alone, a defense for persons lacking the state of mind deemed 
essential by the courts but not specifically required by Congress as a 
prerequisite for punishment. 
Finally, courts should substantially overhaul federal mens rea doctrine.  
Quite simply, the doctrine is in dire need of reform, both in its underlying 
theory and in its operational details.  For the stated purpose of preventing 
punishment for morally blameless (or “innocent”) conduct, the Supreme 
Court has made “innocence protection” the driving force in mens rea 
selection.
191
  Heightened mens rea requirements can and should be imposed 
 
188 In response to the acquittal of President Reagan’s would-be assassin on insanity 
grounds, Congress enacted a statute adopting a considerably narrower formulation of the 
insanity defense.  See Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 
2057 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2006)) (rejecting the Model Penal Code’s 
formulation, previously adopted by the federal courts, in favor of the common law’s more 
restrictive one). 
189 Indeed, the Court had recognized as much prior to Oakland Cannabis.  See United 
States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415–16 n.11 (1980) (noting that common law defenses to 
crimes remain enforceable because “Congress in enacting criminal statutes legislates against 
a background of Anglo-Saxon common law”).  More controversially, it is possible to argue 
that, in legislating against the background of a common law containing nonstatutory criminal 
defenses, Congress not only accepted the previously created roster of defenses but also 
judicial power to create nonstatutory defenses.  For an argument that Oakland Cannabis and, 
indeed, federal mens rea doctrine rest on an unduly cramped conception of the separation of 
powers in criminal law, see Smith, supra note 137, at 65–74, 84–89. 
190 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952). 
191 See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000).  See generally Smith, 
supra note 20, at 131 (“The Supreme Court has insisted that federal crimes be defined in 
terms that guarantee a path to acquittal for morally blameless conduct and has increasingly 
looked to the mental element of crimes to provide this protection against punishment for 
‘innocent’ conduct.”). 
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where (and only where) a federal criminal statute would otherwise 
potentially reach morally blameless conduct.
192
 
At the level of theory, the goal of mens rea doctrine is sound but 
unduly narrow.  It makes sense to avoid punishment for morally blameless 
punishment; after all, as Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley have 
shown, the criminal justice system works better if it reaches results, such as 
a desert-based distribution of punishment, that the public accepts as fair and 
legitimate.
193
  A system that punishes morally blameless conduct is 
undoubtedly unfair, but so, too, is a system that imposes punishment in 
excess of blameworthiness, i.e., disproportionately severe punishment for 
blameworthy acts.  The goal of mens rea doctrine should thus not merely be 
to avoid punishing blameless acts but to limit punishment, for blameless 
and blameworthy conduct alike, in accordance with blameworthiness—and 
that broader goal requires ruling out all punishment for blameless acts and 
ensuring that the punishment for blameworthy acts “fits” the crime.
194
 
In addition to making disproportionate punishment a proper concern of 
mens rea doctrine, courts should free the prevailing federal method of 
selecting mens rea levels from the shackles that prevent it from achieving 
its important goal of aligning punishment and blameworthiness.  Once 
courts detect a potential innocence-protection problem—understood not just 
as the potential for punishment of blameless acts, but also as 
disproportionate punishment for blameworthy acts—the courts should 
impose whatever heightened mens rea requirement is necessary to limit 
 
192 As I have explained: 
Where the nature of the prohibited act, as defined by Congress, is sufficient to guarantee that 
anyone convicted of the crime will be morally blameworthy, courts treat the legislative definition 
of the crime as conclusive and do not impose heightened mens rea requirements.  If, however, 
the prohibited act is not “inevitably nefarious” and thus could potentially reach innocent conduct, 
courts adopt more stringent mens rea requirements designed to exclude all innocent conduct 
from the crime’s reach. 
Smith, supra note 20, at 130; see, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 
704–06 (2000) (ruling that, to convict for obstruction of justice on a “corrupt persuasion” 
theory, the government must prove that the defendant knew his or her efforts to conceal 
documents from federal investigators were illegal); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 
608–16 (1994) (holding that, because gun possession is an innocuous act in our gun-friendly 
culture, defendants cannot be convicted for possessing unregistered “firearms” unless they 
knew the characteristics of their weapons that subjected them to special federal registration 
requirements); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994) (requiring proof of 
knowledge of illegality to prevent punishment of innocuous efforts to structure cash 
transactions to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements). 
193 See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, supra note 120.  See generally Smith, supra note 8, at 
887–88 (explaining the importance to retributivists and utilitarians alike of limiting 
punishment in accordance with moral blameworthiness). 
194 For an argument along these lines, see Smith, supra note 20. 
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punishment in accordance with blameworthiness.
195
  In doing so, courts 
should not be at all reluctant to require prosecutors, where necessary to 
avoid morally undeserved punishment, to prove that the defendant knew his 
conduct was illegal. 
This more robust mens rea doctrine could be the single most important 
contribution the courts could make to avoiding the qualitative problems 
associated with overcriminalization.  The overcriminalization “horror 
stories” typically involve prosecutors using obscure regulatory laws as traps 
for unwary citizens who are understandably unaware either of the existence 
or meaning of the law in question.
196
  To the extent judges in these cases 
start demanding proof that the defendants actually knew they were breaking 
the law they are charged with violating, prosecutors could no longer count 
on getting guilty pleas or guilty verdicts for innocuous conduct that a law-
abiding person might have engaged in.  The effect would be more than 
simply to prevent unjust punishment, although that is a worthy goal in its 
own right.  It would also give the federal government much-needed 
incentives either to give the regulated public notice that such obscure 
crimes exist, thereby enabling law-abiding citizens to obey the law and 
prosecutors to prove knowing illegality by lawbreakers, or, as Professor 
Darryl Brown helpfully suggests,
197
 to use administrative enforcement 
mechanisms, in place of criminal prosecutions, to achieve the government’s 
regulatory goals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As this survey of federal criminal law has shown, overcriminalization 
is a serious problem in the federal system and, more generally, for 
American criminal law.  The number and scope of criminal laws, however, 
is only the tip of the iceberg.  Ultimately, overcriminalization is so 
problematic because it tends to degrade the quality of criminal codes and 
result in unwarranted punishment, jeopardizing the quality of justice the 
 
195 See generally id. 
196 For a collection of case studies where this has occurred, see, e.g., Case Studies, supra 
note 16.  The website does not mince words: 
[The] case studies are documented stories of good people whose lives were impacted by 
overcriminalization: criminal laws that are overbroad or flat-out ridiculous, prosecutors and 
prosecutions that are over-zealous, and sentences that are harsh, unreasonable, and unjust.  The 
lives of some were shattered when they were arrested, prosecuted, and imprisoned for doing 
things no one would think are crimes.  Others did an act that could be considered wrongful, but 
did so unintentionally—without “criminal intent” (what lawyers call mens rea)—and should not 
have been charged, convicted, or punished. 
Id. 
197 See Darryl Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 677–83 (2011). 
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system generates.  Where, as in the federal system, overcriminalization is 
the order of the day, the actus reus and mens rea elements of crimes tend to 
be poorly defined, and these crime-definition problems are magnified across 
the multiplicity of statutes applicable to the same criminal act.  In such a 
system, the legislature is no longer supreme in matters of crime and 
punishment; it is ultimately prosecutors, who exploit incompletely defined 
crimes and the redundancy of the criminal code to expand the scope of their 
power and ratchet up the punishment that convicted defendants face. 
Most attribute the blame for that unjust state of affairs, and for the 
federalization of crime more generally, to Congress, but closer inspection 
reveals a very different story.  The courts have done quite a lot to facilitate 
federalization and the unmistakable drift toward greater severity in federal 
sanctions.  They have done so by construing criminal statutes expansively, 
extending the reach, scope, and redundancy of federal criminal law.  As if 
that were not bad enough, the courts have allowed prosecutors to treat the 
penalty prescribed in specific criminal statutes as merely an opening bid in 
an attempt to secure the highest possible sentence: even where a federal 
statute specifically applies to a particular criminal act, courts have often 
broadly construed more general overlapping statutes carrying higher 
penalties to encompass the act.  To make sure the blameworthy do not get 
away, the courts have exposed the guilty to punishment in excess of 
blameworthiness and opened the floodgates to federal criminal cases, 
transforming every U.S. District Court into “a ‘police court’ where judges 
are under ‘constant pressure to keep cases moving as fast as possible.’”
198
 
As judges decry this state of affairs and scholars hope against hope for 
bold legislative or constitutional solutions, they have missed something 
critical.  Given that the federal courts helped make federal criminal law as 
broad and as punitive as it is, there is a ready solution to 
overcriminalization’s many problems short of legislative self-restraint or 
judicial activism in the name of the Constitution.  The solution is for federal 
judges to approach their vital interpretive functions with keen sensitivity to 
the many adverse effects that overcriminalization—and the courts’ current, 
self-defeating interpretive strategies—create for federal criminal law.  If 
courts cease giving unwarranted scope to ambiguous criminal laws and 
redouble their efforts to avoid the imposition of morally undeserved 
punishment, overcriminalization need not be the disaster that so many, with 
good cause, believe it to be. 
In short, although a substantially smaller and comprehensively 
overhauled criminal code would be ideal, we need not await a congressional 
 
198 Sanford H. Kadish, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1250–51 
(1995) (quoting remarks by Chief Judge Judith Keep of the Southern District of California). 
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epiphany in order to overcome overcriminalization.  All we need is for 
judges to quit playing the overcriminalization game in which they, no less 
than legislators, have proven to be far too adept.  Only if that happens will 
judges be in a position to cry foul if overcriminalization continues 
unabated. 
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